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Abstract 
 
In evaluating the role of international law, most scholarship focuses on how international 
laws, treaties and courts function and are enforced. However, to best understand how 
international laws are created, as well as how they are internalized within individual countries’ 
judicial systems, it is also necessary to look at the normative side of international law. This 
project applies the theory of transnational legal process to examine how recognized international 
norms are uniquely recognized by different legal systems. More specifically, I analyze how 
political culture affects the level of consistency between international privacy norms and 
domestic law through the study of judicial decisions from United States Supreme Court and the 
French Court of Cassation. I conclude that the cases studied indicate a correlation between 
political culture and the manner in which international privacy norms are recognized and applied. 
Although political culture does not lead to significantly different conceptions of privacy rights 
and the protections they deserve, it does affect the process through which understandings of 
privacy evolve in response to new technology. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
  
One of the many discussions to come out of the Edward Snowden revelations in June 
2013 is how understandings of privacy differ within the international community. The Snowden 
revelations, which highlighted the scope of the surveillance policies by the United States 
National Security Agency (NSA), led to a negative reaction within the international community, 
particularly the European Union, and sparked a discussion about how understandings of privacy 
have evolved in an increasingly digitalized world. Within six months of the Snowden incident, 
the United Nations (U.N.) passed a resolution regarding the “right to privacy in the digital age,” 
holding that states have a “responsibility to protect human rights.”1 This newfound attention to 
privacy as a human right demonstrates a normative shift within the international community. But 
what are the current norms and how are they shifting? The oldest and most widely-recognized 
mention of privacy by the U.N. comes from The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which was adopted in 1948. Article 12 of the UDHR reads, “No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon 
his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.”2  
As mentioned earlier, the international community re-examined the question of privacy in 
2013 in light of the extent of the NSA’s digital surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden, as the 
U.N. evaluated how technological advances have affected a modern definition of privacy.3 On 
June 30, 2014, the U.N. released a report entitled, “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age” 
detailing how member states should recognize and protect privacy. The report recognizes that 
“digital surveillance may engage a State’s human rights obligations if that surveillance involves 
the State’s exercise of power or effective control in relation to digital communications 
 2 
infrastructure,” meaning that limitations on the State’s exercise of power apply to digital 
surveillance as they would for any other state action with the potential to violate human rights.4 
The report also emphasizes the importance of proportionality between the government interest in 
national security or criminal justice and the privacy rights of the individuals; as such, the least 
invasive method possible for a desired end must be used.5  
Furthermore, in November 2014, the United Nations passed a second resolution on 
privacy that recalled a resolution from December 2013. The earlier treaty noted the need for a 
right to digital privacy, acknowledged the Human Rights Council’s adoption of the June 
resolution, and provided more specific definition of the right to digital privacy. The new 
resolution emphasizes the legal obligation of states to “respect international human rights law 
when they intercept private communications directly or extract personal data from a company.”6 
The report also recognizes the “global and open nature of the Internet and the rapid advancement 
in information and communication technologies,” while affirming that “the same rights that 
people have offline must also be protected online.”7 The reports from June and November 2014, 
which are indicative of current international norms, recognize that privacy rights apply equally to 
digital communications and information. As such, government action that uses digital 
surveillance must act in accordance with previous laws designed to protect human rights such as 
privacy.  
However, while the international norms regarding privacy in the digital age are being 
further defined, there remains, as demonstrated by the United States’ NSA surveillance policies, 
a lack of uniformity in terms of how individual countries interpret privacy issues. Different 
political structures could possibly explain violations of internationally recognized privacy rights 
in countries with dictatorial governments where human rights abuses are more common. 
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However, as the media following the Snowden revelations revealed, the lack of international 
uniformity in terms of privacy law also differs between countries with similar democratic 
political structures, such as the United States and France.8 This project seeks to understand if a 
distinction truly exists between how domestic law in France and the United States recognizes 
privacy law, but more importantly, why this distinction might exist. I hypothesize that internal 
political culture, as represented by a state’s federal judiciary, affects the extent to which states 
internalize international norms within their own laws. While this project looks only at the United 
States and France, the conclusions regarding the effects of political culture may be relevant to 
understanding discrepancies between international and domestic law in other countries, and 
potentially other issues. 
To account for this cultural aspect, this project extends beyond studying solely the 
relationship between international law and domestic law, where international law acts as an 
independent variable that affects domestic law, the dependent variable. A third variable, political 
culture, is added as a conditional variable on this relationship because I hypothesize that political 
culture alters the manner in which international law translates to domestic law. While political 
culture can be interpreted in numerous ways, I look specifically at the foundational legal 
documents, most notably the constitutions, within each state, as well as the philosophical and 
theoretical influences on each document. These documents provide the most relevant concept of 
political culture for my study, as they illustrate how society’s cultural understanding of notions 
such as privacy are then translated into the structure of the political system. Because documents 
such as constitutions provide a basis for understanding political culture, I must use a form of 
domestic law that is well connected to constitutional principles. Federal judicial decisions 
provide this connection, as they involve justices interpreting constitutional principles to apply to 
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new legal questions. I therefore, after analyzing the political culture of each state, apply a 
comparative legal analysis to privacy cases within each state’s highest federal court in order to 
understand how cultural conceptions affect the outcomes of these decisions. 
 I begin my study with a review of relevant international law scholarship in Chapter Two. 
This chapter provides an overview of the relevant theoretical discussions about international law, 
as well as how issues such as globalization have affected the discipline of international law. 
Chapter Two also discusses transnational law as a new theoretical approach for understanding 
laws that transcend national borders and includes a section in French to discuss relevant 
francophone scholarship on international law. Following the discussion of relevant literature and 
theory, Chapter Three delves into the methods I employ for applying these theories to my 
research question. The methodology section further highlights what variables are being 
investigated: political culture, international and domestic law, as well as how they are identified 
and measured. In Chapter Four I define and explore my conditional variable, political culture, in 
each country through an analysis of their constitutions, recognitions of protected individual 
rights, and the influences on each. In Chapter Five I use this understanding of political culture to 
review privacy cases from the United States Supreme Court. In Chapter Six I employ similar 
methods to examine the relationship between French political culture and domestic law as 
reflected in decisions by the French Court of Cassation. Finally, in Chapter Seven I analyze the 
patterns from Chapters Four, Five and Six concerning how the countries are applying privacy 
law, as well as how political culture affects these results. I am therefore able to draw conclusions 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 The topic of international law has certainly attracted a large amount of scholarship over 
the past several centuries. This chapter draws from some of this scholarship to gain a greater 
understanding of the relevant theories that exist surrounding international law. I begin with 
literature providing a more traditional approach to international law, by touching upon the 
international community’s recognition of international law in recent history, the generally 
accepted sources of international law, and the traditional debates surrounding the topic. I then 
turn to literature addressing the current issues with international law, particularly related to 
globalization. This discussion transitions into a discussion of one of the most recent theoretical 
approaches, transnational law, and more specifically, transnational legal process, which provides 
a significant foundation for my own study. I end with an exploration of French literature on 
international law in order to gain a more comprehensive view of how scholars address 
international law, both currently and historically, on a more global level in order to see the 
theoretical differences that exist. 
 
International Law 
History of International Law  
 Many scholars consider Hugo Grotius to be the father of modern international law 
because of his publication De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (On the Laws of War and Peace) in 1625. In 
his writing Grotius emphasizes the importance of morality and justice as obligations within 
international society, thus providing the foundation for a series of “laws of nations”. However, 
Grotius was not the first to write on this topic; he drew many of his ideas from Spanish 
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theologians such as Vitoria and Suarez, among others. These earlier theologians focused on the 
inherent laws that they believed guided states as a result of the Catholic Church. Grotian theory 
differed from these precedents by providing a “secularized” approach to these laws, where states 
may be bound by certain rules not because of the Church but because of an inherent sense of 
morality and justice within society.1 
 Hersch Lauterpacht notes several key components of Grotian legal theory in his essay 
recognizing the tercentenary of Grotius’ death. I will focus on two specific components on his 
essay that are particularly relevant to an understanding of modern international law. First, 
Grotius argues that international relations are completely subjected to the rule of law. Part of this 
argument is the rejection of war as states’ absolute right but instead classifying just and unjust 
war. Another key aspect of this “total subjection” is religiously based, as Grotius, unlike the 
theologians before him, held that all international relations, not only the relations between 
Christian states, could be guided by treaties.2 While this seems less significant in modern times, 
it demonstrated the important universality of international law and also helps highlight why 
Grotius became such a significant theorist compared to those before him. 
 A second component of Grotian theory is his recognition of natural law as a source of 
international law. While Grotius recognizes the importance of sovereign lawmakers as well as 
treaties and rules upon which states expressly agree, he also recognizes the importance of natural 
law as an independent source of law.3 Natural law is best understood as “claims of a universal 
consciousness of justice” or rules that, while unspoken or unwritten, still apply as law to all.4 
Grotius applies natural law in an international context by arguing that states are bound by both 
“the law of nations and the law of nature”. Thus, a state may be bound to act in a certain way, not 
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because of an explicit contract with another state, by which the involved parties consented to be 
bound, but because there is a higher law that binds all.5 
To further understand how international law originated and the significance of Grotian 
theory, it is beneficial to turn to the classic theoretical debate regarding the sources and nature of 
law. Legal theorists have traditionally been separated into two camps: natural lawyers and legal 
positivists. Natural lawyers, as previously mentioned, look to undefined norms and morals as 
sources of law that bind all humans. Legal positivists, on the other hand, claim law is simply 
what a sovereign decides it to be; if there is no sovereign, there can be no law.6 Positivism is best 
represented by the writings of John Austin, who argued: “laws proper or properly so called are 
commands: laws which are not commands, are laws improperly so called.”7 Furthermore, Austin 
notes the importance of who creates the laws and to whom those laws apply, as every law “is set 
by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body..., to a member or members of the independent 
political society wherein that person or body is sovereign.”8 International law is, through this 
traditional Austinian lens, not really law because there are not specifically commanded rules or 
creators of rules, but rather a series of interpreted norms designed to guide state behavior.9 
This theoretical dichotomy is seen in Grotius’ conception of international law, 
specifically because he finds a balance between both natural and positive law. In recognizing that 
all states are bound by certain higher laws of justice, but that most international law is still 
specifically enumerated and consented to, Grotius acknowledges both sides. This has in some 
ways contributed to the debate between positivists and natural lawyers about international law, as 
both sides attempt to interpret Grotian theory in their favor. These two theoretical approaches 
therefore remain relevant to the modern debate surrounding international law. British lawyer 
William Edward Hall contrasts approaches to international law within this framework, claiming 
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that one conception, the natural law approach, included “logical applications of principles of 
right to international relations,” whereas the second conception, the positivist approach, looked 
to “the concrete rules actually in use.”10 Each of these conceptions reflects one of the two main 
components of Grotian international law mentioned previously. 
The debate behind international law goes beyond looking at how it should be defined to 
include a debate of whether international law is even authoritative as law. Because of the nature 
of international law, and its application on states in a global arena rather than on individuals 
within a society, scholars have raised doubts about the legitimacy of international law as an 
actual form of law. In his essay “The Concept of Law,” H.L.A. Hart addresses these doubts and 
proposes theoretical approaches to resolve them. Hart identifies two primary doubts concerning 
international law. First, international law, unlike municipal law, lacks the necessary backing of 
threats to be enforceable. This doubt arises from the positivist concern that unless law is backed 
by threat or organized sanctions, it will not be considered binding by the group to whom it 
applies.11 Hart then argues that law, whether municipal or international, gains recognition and 
therefore adherence through practice and general pressure for conformity. Although some states 
may not always follow international laws, just as some individuals may not always follow 
municipal laws, this does not negate their legitimacy. Therefore without being backed by 
authoritative threats, Hart argues that international laws may still be binding if they are generally 
accepted and followed by the international community.12  
Second, Hart addresses the other core positivist concern about international law: because 
states are sovereign entities, they cannot be bound by a greater authority such as international 
law. However, Hart refutes this doubt by emphasizing that a state is bound by no law but yet is 
the source of law for its subjects, as each state has both a population living within certain borders 
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being held to a consistent set of laws and a government with a certain level of independence. 
However, this independence is not absolute and there are many degrees of independence and 
dependence between states. Hart notes that this is represented by the existence of colonies, 
protectorates, and confederations. By moving away from this traditional view of the ‘state’ it is 
possible to move beyond the notion that states cannot be bound by international law or can only 
be bound by certain forms of international law.13  
 Legal scholar David Kennedy further concentrates on the sources of international law, 
highlighting how the “source doctrine” approach provides a framework for understanding how 
states apply international law.14 Kennedy cites Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, which acknowledges four legal sources. First, international conventions establish 
definitive rules between states, for example, specific treaties between countries. Second, there 
are international customs, which are created by “general practice accepted as law.” Third, 
Kennedy lists “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” which, similarly to 
international customs, is an inherently normative source. Fourth, judicial decisions and the 
findings in highly respected and qualified academia may also be used as a means of determining 
the rule of law in an international context.15 Kennedy’s arguments thus reflect a more Grotian 
approach to the origins of international law, as he cites both positivist and natural law sources. 
Kennedy also classifies sources of international law in another manner, by differentiating 
between “hard” and “soft” sources. “Hard” sources involve the consent of the parties involved, 
making them binding and therefore easier to enforce. These include international conventions 
and judicial decisions, the first and fourth sources of international law previously discussed by 
Kennedy. “Soft” sources, however, do not require the consent of states involved but rather are 
based upon international norms that the international community expects states to follow. They 
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include international customs and general principles accepted as law, the second and third 
sources defined by Kennedy. “Soft” sources of law are more complicated to enforce because it 
becomes easy for the state accused of breaking the “law” to argue that it has “a different idea of 
softness” or “a different image of the system of justice.”16 In looking at “soft” sources of law, 
Kennedy takes a similar approach as Hart in holding that laws may still be held as legally 
binding as long as they are acknowledged and followed by a significant part of the international 
community. A source doctrine approach to international law is therefore about more than the 
concrete written treaties binding states to certain behavior, but also the more abstract notions of 
norms and customs that can be used to persuade states to conform to internationally accepted 
behavior. It therefore finds a middle ground between the natural and positive law theories. 
 
Normative International Law 
Scholars often have looked to jus cogens norms, also called peremptory norms, when 
analyzing normative effects on state behavior. These norms, which create the “soft” sources of 
law discussed by Kennedy, are one of the most controversial sources of international law. 
Scholar Larry May argues that this is because jus cogens norms imply that “there are 
international normative standards that govern how States act within their own borders and 
toward their own subjects” and that these norms “hold true for all States, perhaps at all times.”17 
Because of the universal nature of these norms, May argues that they can be used to prohibit 
certain actions, such as genocide, for all members of the international community, and can justify 
an international response if violated. This concept of officially recognizing international norms 
as binding determinants of international action first originated in Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention in 1969. According to Article 53, a treaty may be declared as void if it conflicts with 
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a “peremptory norm”, or “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”18 This 
definition and application of jus cogens norms is significant because it allows a “soft” source of 
international law to supersede a “hard” source of international law if the treaty in question 
violates a norm. May’s interpretation of the significance of jus cogens norms therefore supports a 
notion of international law where natural law may supersede positive international law. 
The heart of the controversy surrounding jus cogens norms can thus be reflected by the 
debate between positive and natural law. In applying legal positivism to international law, May 
argues that because there is no international sovereign creating laws, there are no binding 
international laws. However, he also references Hart’s philosophy because, although Hart is 
typically identified as a legal positivist, he does identify a minimal level of moral and legal 
norms within a legal society. As noted earlier, this perspective allows Hart to acknowledge 
certain normative international law as binding.19 While less extreme legal positivists such as Hart 
may be willing to accept minimal normative law, positivists generally disregard international 
law, particularly when normative international law is used to negate more recognized laws and 
treaties. 
On the other end of legal theoretical spectrum, natural law also can be used to understand 
the discussion behind the legitimacy of international legal norms, or jus cogens norms. As part of 
her critique of international law, Hazel Fox applies natural legal theory to better explain jus 
cogens norms. She first defines natural law as laws that are not created by a specific person or 
group but are inherent to the legal system. Jus cogens norms are a form of natural law because 
they represent universal moral and ethical ideas that are recognized but not specifically created 
 13 
by states.20 The controversy behind international normative law can therefore be understood 
through the dichotomy of these two principal legal theories. If interpreting law from a positivist 
approach, international law, or more specifically jus cogens norms, is highly problematic 
because they cannot be truly created as laws and therefore cannot persuade legal action. 
However, if analyzing laws from a natural law approach, international law is plausible through 
jus cogens norms because it is reasonable to use universal moral and ethical beliefs to guide 
either individual or state behavior. 
However, there is another aspect of normative international law, aside form its authority, 
that creates issues in terms of implementation. Although scholar Jagdish Bhagwati primarily 
addresses economic globalization, he does look at shortcomings within international normative 
law as part of his analysis. According to Bhagwati, the extent to which international norms are 
dictated into specific behavioral expectations affects how well they are accurately implemented 
by state actors. While domestic legislation and executive orders are generally more clearly 
defined, normative or “customary” international law is often broadly stated. This allows states to 
conform to international norms simply by “interpreting” them in a favorable way. It also creates 
controversy within the international system because the conformance of a state to customary 
laws is highly dependent on who is interpreting the laws.21 Bhagwati’s concern about the 
universality and implementation of international norms undermines a key component of natural 
lawyers’ defense of international law. According to natural legal theory, there are unwritten but 
universal codes of conduct that all individuals and states are bound to; if this is true, then there 




International Law and Sovereignty 
To understand how these more theoretical notions are practically applied to the global 
political system, it is necessary to understand sovereignty and its role in interstate systems. In his 
lecture “The End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the International System and the 
Challenge to International Law”, Daniel Bethlehem provides a background to historical 
conceptions of sovereignty, highlighting the “Westphalian system of inter-state law.”22 This 
system, born from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, centered on sovereign states whose 
interactions would be regulated by law. It is thus fundamental to the study of laws between states 
to first understand sovereignty as it applies within state borders. State sovereignty, as described 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice, “rests fundamentally on the notion of exclusive 
authority over discrete parcels of territory,” and includes the freedom to make economic, 
political, financial, and other decisions within state borders.23 But why is sovereignty significant 
for studying international law? Bethlehem examines sovereignty as it relates to a state’s 
jurisdiction, or “the authority of a state to govern persons, conduct, and property by its municipal 
law.”24 In this way, Bethlehem defines sovereignty as fitting into Hart’s traditional notion of the 
state by arguing that states have traditionally been given legal authority within their own 
territory. As a result, sovereignty, and therefore the application of a legal system, is inherently 
related to geography. As we begin to look at legal issues beyond state borders, state sovereignty 
and the jurisdiction it creates must still be considered, but they are no longer sufficient legal 
determinants. This is a particularly relevant consideration for my research project as it is 
necessary to analyze how issues, such as electronic data surveillance and privacy, that transcend 
state borders form international norms and law that must still be addressed by domestic legal 
systems within determined state borders. 
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Globalization and Challenges to International Law 
Because of the significance of state borders and the sovereignty they represent, 
globalization has become a key consideration when looking at how states currently interact. This 
is equally true for the study of international law. A major aspect of globalization has been 
increased mobility, whether of individuals, of ideas, or of commercial goods. The increase in 
international interactions has led to a shift in the role of international law; recent international 
legal studies thus focus increasingly on globalization’s effects on sovereign states and 
international institutions.25 While Bethlehem, for example, does not argue that geography and 
borders will become obsolete, he emphasizes how transnational activity has increased as a result 
of globalization. Previous notions of territoriality may therefore not provide the adequate 
framework to address international legal issues in the future.26 In other words, he concludes, 
globalization will not completely uproot existing international legal framework, but may require 
a fresh approach. 
Bethlehem also touches on specific aspects of international law that, as a result of 
globalization, must be re-evaluated in order to remain relevant. First, international organizations 
and institutions still reflect territorial notions of international law, making them inadequate to 
address more modern legal issues facing the legal community, such as electronic 
communications. Bethlehem adds that is may be necessary to create a ‘deemed jurisdiction’ to 
address questions, for example cyber security, that fall outside a traditional geographic space.27 
Second, he notes that the international community lacks sufficient processes for the creation and 
implementation of laws. Because the international community lacks these standard procedures, 
legal practice and legal interpretations within states become flexible and inconsistent. This 
concern is similar to Bhagwati’s commentary on international norms, as both scholars argue that 
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states will interpret international law in the manner that benefits them. In order to adapt to the 
constantly changing global environment, the international legal system must be able to 
efficiently reform laws.28 As the international community becomes increasingly entwined, with 
fewer issues confined only to within state borders, there will be an increased burden on 
international law to adapt and properly address these legal questions.  
Rafael Domingo further expands upon the challenges facing international law and how 
the international legal system must evolve with the global community.29 Domingo, like 
Bethlehem, emphasizes that the international law will no longer remain relevant in the future if it 
continues to focus on political concepts such as sovereignty, territoriality, and the individual 
nation-state.30 However, he takes a more radical approach to the future of international law, by 
arguing that we must move away from a system of international law based on sovereign states 
and toward a system of global law.31 More specifically, he states, “sovereignty – along with the 
concept of territorial jurisdiction – has run its course and done so successfully” but that “the new 
global order and the paradigm shift in international relations require a new legal framework, built 
on a series of global principles that go beyond the mold and limitations of the state-based 
model.”32 It is thus not only the current international legal structures that cannot properly 
respond to globalization, but that the theoretical approach to both international relations and 
international law must shift away from a focus on the nation-state. 
 
Transnational Law 
Response to Limitations of International Law 
 One core criticism of international law concerns the use of the word ‘international’ 
because the relationship it details, the interaction of sovereign states, may no longer be valid in 
 17 
the study of law. If actions beyond state borders occur increasing between individuals and 
multinational corporations, the law governing these actions should no longer be defined in terms 
of being between ‘nations’. Just as many scholars, such as Bethlehem and Domingo, critique 
international law for its inability to adjust to an increasingly globalized world, others criticize the 
use of “international law” to describe a global legal order that is no longer “international”. One 
notable scholar with this latter viewpoint is Philip C. Jessup, who created the concept of 
“transnational law” as a new approach to law in the global arena. The major difference between 
international and transnational law is the main actors. While international law views sovereign 
nations as the principal actors in the global legal system, transnational law looks at “individuals, 
corporations, states, organizations of states, [and] other groups.”33 Because the variety of 
possible actors in transnational situations, Jessup notes that transnational law encompasses both 
public and private law, further defining it as “law which regulates actions or events that 
transcend national frontiers.”34 Transnational law therefore differs from international law both in 
terms of the actors involved as well as the types of law, public and private, that it can address. 
 In determining the practical application of transnational legal principles, Jessup turns first 
to the issue of jurisdiction. With a previous international legal approach, jurisdiction was 
inherently tied to sovereignty, as each state had jurisdiction within its own borders. International 
law could influence state action, but only national laws could affect individual citizens. 
International law thus only applies to individuals after it has been incorporated into a state’s 
national laws.35 However, with transnational law, jurisdiction is less defined, an issue that Jessup 
suggests can be resolved by moving away from a traditional territorial notion of jurisdiction. He 
argues that “it would be the function of transnational law to reshuffle the cases and to deal out 
jurisdiction in the manner most conducive to the needs and convenience of all members of the 
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international community,” further noting that, “the fundamental approach would not start with 
sovereignty or power but from the premise that jurisdiction is essentially a matter of procedure 
which could be amicably arranged among the nations of the world.”36 Through the adoption of 
transnational law, the international community can mutually create a new system of jurisdiction 
that can better address issues both within and between states. A transnational approach therefore 
creates solutions to some of the shortcomings of international law, particularly those related to 
state sovereignty. 
 But how does transnational law differ from international law and how has this newer 
conception of law remained relevant? In his paper discussing more recent conceptions of 
transnational law, Craig Scott analyzes how Jessup’s concept  of transnational law has evolved. 
Prior to delving into these modern conceptions, Scott distinguishes transnational law from 
international law, arguing, “while international law as interstate law is more or less the same as 
talking about law between or amongst states, transnational law can variously connote law across 
states, law beyond states, or law through states (i.e. states’ legal systems).”37 The changing 
nature of interactions beyond state borders has thus necessitated a change in terminology for the 
laws regulating these interactions. Similarly, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, a law professor at 
University of California Irvine argues that due to the increase in “ideas, people, services, and 
goods [that] cross borders... ‘international’ law is no longer a subject for only the regulation of 
inter-state activities.”38 Transnational law, therefore, is less a completely different area of law 
and more a renaming of existing international law that better reflects the changed nature of these 
more transnational interactions. Harold Koh also expands on the nature of these transnational 
interactions, thus further defining transnational law. Through the use of metaphoric ‘computer-
age imagery’ he highlights three key ways in which transnational law operates. First, he holds 
 19 
that there are laws that are “downloaded from international to domestic law,” for example, 
international norms that are internalized within a domestic legal system.39 Second, there are laws 
that are “uploaded, then downloaded;” a domestic law or legal norm is incorporated into 
international law, where it is then internalized by other states into their own legal systems. 
Finally, there are laws that are “horizontally transplanted,” or transmitted directly from one 
domestic legal system to another, thus bypassing the international law stage.40 Transnational law 
therefore is centered on spread and internalization of norms into defined domestic or 
international law. 
 
Transnational Legal Process 
To demonstrate how his conception of transnational law occurs in the global system, Koh 
outlines the theory of transnational legal process. He defines transnational legal process as “the 
theory and practice of how public and private actors – nation-states, international organizations, 
and private individuals – interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international for 
a state to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize the rule of transnational law.”41 
According to Koh, transnational legal process has four distinct characteristics. First, it is 
nontraditional in the sense that it eliminates standard dichotomies within international legal 
studies, most notably the distinction between public and private law, as well as between domestic 
and international law. Second, it is nonstatist as it looks at actors other than traditional nation-
states. Third, it is dynamic and can shift as legal norms shift. Fourth, it is normative and 
therefore created and adapted by the accepted international norms.42 In demonstrating these four 
aspects, Koh also outlines how this legal process is the result of the evolution of both 
international legal studies as well as international relations scholarship. While this theory builds 
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upon Jessup’s notion of transnational law by highlighting how it applies to the current 
international community, Koh does not significantly highlight the future of transnational law, 
and thus does not address Jessup’s argument about jurisdiction. Therefore, in using transnational 
legal process within my own study, I will only look at jurisdictions as they currently exist rather 
than analyzing how they could shift to better address issues of privacy. Koh’s acceptance of 
current jurisdictions also reflects a lingering respect, at least to a certain extent, for the notion of 
sovereignty that is so central to transnational international legal theory.  
In his article, “Transnational Legal Process and State Change,” Gregory Shaffer further 
expands on this definition of transnational legal process, first by tying it back to the roots of 
law.43 Shaffer emphasizes that all law is, and has been in the recent past, transnational. American 
law, for example, originates from Roman law and English common law. More recently, it has 
evolved from both economic and cultural transnational interactions. Increased transnational 
interactions lead to spread of certain legal norms and the creation of “transnational legal orders” 
where accepted legal norms then govern specific areas of law.44 Shaffer thus defines 
transnational legal process as “the process through which transnational construction and 
conveyance of legal norms takes place.”45 Shaffer also notes that the intersection of transnational 
legal processes with national or local legal processes can “block, adapt, translate, or appropriate 
a transnational legal norm and spur its reassessment.”46 To clarify the process, transnational legal 
processes are the recognition and spread of international legal norms, which, when sufficiently 
articulated and applied, can become transnational legal orders.47 In looking more specifically at 
how international laws and norms are reflected nationally through transnational legal process, 
Shaffer argues that “transnational legal process is not reduced to a process of filling in gaps in 
law’s implementation, but rather seen in dynamic terms in which national, international, and 
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transnational political, social, and legal processes interact.”48 Transnational legal process can 
therefore provide an important theoretical approach for understanding both how law has evolved 
with the rise of globalization and how legal systems adapt to international norms. 
Transnational legal process also provides a foundation for answering the question of why 
states only sometimes obey international laws and treaties. Traditionally scholars have analyzed 
this question by looking primarily at the interests and the identity of the state; however, Koh 
argues that neither of these fully accounts for the ‘normativity’ of transnational legal process.49 
Instead, Koh looks to the concepts of interaction and internalization as potential factors. 
Interaction can better describe the tendency of a state to follow international law than solely 
identity, as repeated interactions between state actors make up a large portion of the international 
laws that states obey. States are encouraged to obey because failure to do so creates friction and 
hinders participation in the international community.50 Similarly, state obedience to international 
law can also be explained by the concept of internalization because, “as transnational actors 
interact, they create patterns of behavior and generate norms of external conduct which they in 
turn internalize.” This process of internalization results in international norms being incorporated 
into domestic law, further ensuring that the state will follow them. States can internalize norms 
through “executive action, legislation, and judicial decisions which take account of and 
incorporate international norms.”51 In transnational legal process, norms are therefore created 
through interactions, incorporated into a state’s domestic law and then obeyed through the 
process of internalization.  
There are thus several reasons why transnational law and transnational legal process 
provide the best theoretical foundation for a study of the implementation of privacy law. First, 
with constant technological advances regarding the internet and digitally stored information, 
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issues related to privacy are no longer confined to national borders. Similarly, there are 
numerous relevant actors, such as multinational companies and individuals, and not just states. 
As a result, the laws and norms pertaining to privacy issues will be increasingly transnational in 
nature and transnational legal theory provides the best framing for understanding them. Because 
my study looks at how international norms and law related to privacy are internalized by 
domestic legal systems, transnational legal process will also be a relevant theoretical approach. 
However, this approach to my research question does not completely deviate from the traditional 
international law concepts, but rather, through a transnational law approach, builds off of core 
concepts of international. Most notably, the notion of sovereignty remains a pertinent 
consideration in analyzing the decisions of domestic courts in the United States and in France. 
 
 
Revue de la littérature scientifique française 
 Pour une compréhension complète d’un sujet international il faut étudier des spécialistes 
internationales en dehors de la communauté anglophone. Alors, en cherchant une meilleure 
compréhension du droit international, j’étudie les travaux des spécialistes de droit qui 
s’expriment en français. Cette partie de la revue de littérature scientifique française examine des 
thèmes principaux à propos du droit international. Ces thèmes incluent le débat entre le droit 
naturel et le droit positif, l’évolution du sujet du droit international, et l’influence croissante du 
droit international au secteur privé. Je compare aussi les idées des auteurs français avec celles 
des auteurs anglophone pour déterminer une meilleure compréhension des thèmes généraux des 
spécialistes du droit international, quelque soit leurs pays d’origine. Cette partie souligne 
premièrement l’histoire du droit international, en discutant les travaux de Marie-Hélène Renaut 
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et J. de Louter. Deuxièmement, on analyse l’effet de la mondialisation sur le droit international 
comme souligné par les travaux de Robert Kolb et Jean-Bernard Auby. 
 
Histoire du droit international 
 En construisant une histoire générale du droit international, Marie-Hélène Renaut 
commence avec la création de l’idée moderne du « droit des gens » qui vient de Francisco 
Suarez, un théologien espagnol actif à la fin du XVIe et au début du XVIIe siècles. Suarez a 
souligné qu’il existe une communauté universelle entres les hommes, et selon l’interprétation de 
Renaut, il y a « le droit des gens… qui régit cette communauté. »52 Ce droit des gens peuvent 
être divisé en deux catégories : le droit des gens naturel et le droit des gens positif. Ces 
catégories suivent les principes générales des théories légales discutées dans la première section 
du travail présent. C’est à dire que le droit de gens naturel représente une « norme supérieure » 
qui existe pour tous. De l’autre côté, le ‘droit positif des gens’ est évolutif et vient des coutumes 
mais, aux yeux de Suarez, doit s’adapter au droit naturel.53 Comme Mark Janis a discuté, Suarez 
était aussi un des théologiens principaux qui a inspiré Grotius.54 Alors, ses idées du ‘droit des 
gens’ sont pertinents à l’analyse de la théorie Grotian du droit international.  
Renaut exprime, de la même façon que Janis, que Grotius a donné un aspect de 
positivisme au droit de gens tel qu’il avait été formulée par Suarez. Aux mots de Renaut, Grotius 
a été considéré le fondateur du droit international à cause de son vue que « le droit des gens est 
un ensemble de règles positives issues d’un accord entre les peuples. »55 Avec cette notion, 
Grotius ajoute un degré de positivisme au droit des gens déterminé avant par Suarez. À part de 
l’explication plus théorique de Grotius, ce qui est assez similaire aux analyses de Janis et 
Lauterpacht, Renault explique aussi deux sources principales de cette théorie de Grotius. 
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Premièrement, selon Renaut, Grotius a été influencé par les concepts libéraux. Dans son œuvre, 
Du droit de la guerre et de la paix, il crée les règles que déterminent quand un pays peut faire la 
guerre. Ce droit de guerre crée les causes justes pour faire la guerre ainsi que les conditions pour 
la neutralité et le traitement des prisonniers.56 Ces directives d’action internationale représentent 
une mélange de droit naturel et de droit positif qui oblige la communauté au droit supranational. 
Les notions de Grotius illustraient aussi les idées principales du libéralisme, c’est à dire qu’on 
peut régler et limiter les pays d’un niveau supranational pour diminuer la fréquence de la guerre. 
Deuxièmement, la théorie de Grotius du droit international a aussi des origines dans les 
considérations plus réalistes et traditionnels. Pour Grotius, la motivation de ses théories n’était 
pas seulement académique, mais « en grande partie commandée par le système économique qui 
règle le commerce. »57 Grotius, comme une juriste en Hollande, devait aussi considérer la 
croissance de l’économie hollandaise. La création du droit international n’était pas, par 
conséquent, seulement à la poursuite des motivations libérales telles que la protection des droits 
des gens ou pour éviter la guerre. Les considérations économiques et les avantages commerciales 
d’un système plus régulé ont provoqué aussi la création du droit international. Par exemple, le 
droit maritime était un des sujets particulièrement importants à Grotius parce que la Hollande 
était à ce temps là un pays colonial. Les actions commerciaux maritimes affectaient l’économie 
et donc les affaires importantes de la Hollande.58 Avec le droit international concernant ces 
actions maritimes, la Hollande pouvait agir sur ses intérêts nationaux signifiants. Dans ce 
contexte, la poursuite des lois internationaux s’adapte non seulement aux idées plus libérales 
mais aussi au concepts réalistes. Dans le contexte de mon étude, un point de vue réaliste peut être 
encore pertinent parce qu’on doit considérer comment les intérêts nationaux des pays, et non 
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seulement les pressions internationales, peuvent influencer les pays à appliquer le droit 
international.  
 Avec la reconnaissance du droit international à cette époque d’histoire, le débat classique 
légal apparaît : le droit international est-il un exemple du droit naturel ou du droit positif ? Dans 
une histoire du droit international classique, J. de Louter souligne ce débat classique de droit. De 
Louter exprime que ce type de droit n’est pas différent que les autres classifications de droit au 
sens que les deux perspectives peuvent s’appliquer.59 Mais, comme H.L.A. Hart, il se penche 
vers une compréhension plus positiviste. De Louter note que le droit international peut être 
classifié comme positif parce qu’il n’est pas seulement philosophique ou morale, et il est plus 
qu’une partie de l’histoire ou de la politique. Le droit international influence ces domaines, et 
donc, doit être considéré comme un concept unique. La conclusion de Louter est claire : « le 
droit international n’est point un aventurier sans abri qui trouve çà et là un pauvre gîte, mais un 
fils légitime, qui mérite une place honorable dans la grande famille du droit. »60 C’est à dire que 
le droit international n’est pas un concept abstrait qui existe conjointement avec des autres types 
de droit, mais qu’il mérite une reconnaissance unique comme une approche indépendante aux 
question légales.  Bien qu’il a un point de vue très positif, l’argument représente le changement 
idéologique du début du XXe siècle en faveur du droit international. 
 
L’Effet de la mondialisation sur le droit international 
 Cette nouvelle perspective sur le droit international continue à évoluer, et est surtout 
influencée par la croissance de la mondialisation. La mondialisation n’est pas un concept récent, 
alors comment peut-on le définir au contexte plus courant ? Politologue français Jean-Bernard 
Auby qui écrit de l’influence de la mondialisation l’explique comme la croissance des 
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interactions transnationales : les interactions économiques, politiques, ou de communication en 
général.61  Robert Kolb, un professeur de droit international à plusieurs universités, analyse 
l’influence de la mondialisation sur ces changements idéologiques dans le domaine du droit 
international. D’abord, Kolb explique la nature traditionnelle du droit international à la fin du 
XIXe siècle avec une description similaire à la théorie classique de Grotius. Mais, il note qu’à 
cette époque-là le droit international était « lié à l’appartenance à une société fermée, dont on ne 
devenait pas automatiquement membre, mais à laquelle on devait admis par cooptation. »62 Il 
utilise les exemples de la Turquie et de la Chine, et du développement de leurs relations avec les 
pays européens pendant ce siècle, pour montrer comment cette cooptation s’est effectuée.  
Au cours du XXe siècle, le système a changé profondément à cause de la croissance de la 
mondialisation et de la création des organisations internationales, pendant une phase que Kolb 
appelle « la ‘constitutionnalisation’ du droit international ».63 Dans cette phase, qui est marqué 
par la création des organisations supranationales comme la Société des Nations, et puis les 
Nations Unies, on a commencé à considérer le droit international comme une doctrine pour un 
système global, et non plus seulement pour les relations entre un petit nombre de pays. Comme 
Larry May, un philosophe américain, Kolb souligne le rôle du positivisme juridique dans le droit 
international traditionnel, mais il insiste que cette école de pensée a dû évoluer pendant la phase 
de constitutionnalisation. Cette phase s’oppose aux doctrines principales de positivisme, 
particulièrement celles qui déterminent qui peut créer les lois.64 En même temps, il est dans cette 
phase que, selon Louter, la perspective positiviste du droit international ajoute aussi la légitimité 
au droit international. Cette phase est donc marqué par plusieurs nouvelles perspectives et 
idéologies en évolution, et même en contradiction, sur les sources du droit international. 
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Un autre changement théorique pendant cette époque est le sujet du droit international. 
Pendant le phase classique du droit international, le sujet du droit était l’état ; mais, dans cette 
nouvelle phase, « l’individu est aussi devenu un sujet du droit international : d’où un mouvement 
mondial des droits de l’homme. »65 Kolb souligne l’importance de ce deuxième changement 
théorique parce que le droit international n’était plus simplement les règles des relations 
internationales mais aussi des normes légales créées à l’égard des individus. Dans ce sens, 
«l’écran étatique est percé : ce qui auparavant relevait exclusivement de la compétence intérieure 
– le fameux domaine réservé – des États devait une matière régie (partiellement) part le droit 
international. »66 Alors, cette phase représente deux changements signifiants : la création du droit 
international normatif et la reconnaissance légale des individus plutôt que seulement les états. 
L’évolution du droit international pendant le dernier siècle représente non seulement la 
croissance de la mondialisation, mais aussi des changements aux théories légales à l’égard du 
système international et de ses lois. 
Ce changement de théorie légale est signifiant pour Jean-Bernard Auby dans son étude 
sur la ‘globalisation’ du droit. En général, Auby affirme que la mondialisation a provoqué le 
droit international à être plus privatisé, au sens qu’il est créé plus souvent pour le secteur privé. 
Faisant référence à Gunther Teubner, Auby écrit, « le centre de gravité du droit se déplace vers 
des régimes privés, et le droit global s’appuie de plus en plus sur des ressources autonomes : 
multinationales, consultants juridiques globaux, fonds, associations, etc. »67 Cet argument suit le 
raisonnement de Kolb à propos du sujet du droit international ; si le sujet du droit international a 
décalé des états aux individus, il suivrait que le droit international en évoluant, influencerait le 
secteur privé et non seulement des relations internationales au domaine public. Auby écrit sur 
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plusieurs aspects du droit international avec cette perspective, mais c’est sa discussion du droit 
international normatif qui est particulièrement pertinente à cette étude. 
En discutant la création du droit international normatif, il fait référence à la croissance du 
droit international privé. Il existe récemment un accroissement des sources du droit 
international ; une partie de cet accroissement est le résultat de plusieurs organisations 
internationaux, mais une autre partie importante est provoquée par le secteur privé et 
l’accroissement des transactions internationales. Il y a des soucis que la multitude des sources 
diminuerait la légitimité du droit international, mais Auby propose une autre hypothèse. Il 
soutient que, «  il y a au contraire prolifération de normes. »68 La croissance du commerce 
international, une des conséquences de la mondialisation, provoque la création des normes 
légales au domaine international.  
Pour décrire comment les normes relient aux organisations du droit Auby utilise les 
classifications des règles primaires (c’est à dire, les règles de la société) et des règles secondaires 
(c’est à dire, les règles qui créent des règles primaires), une philosophie que vient de H.L.A. 
Hart. Auby affirme que les normes internationales agissent comme les règles primaire et dictent 
les actions certains aux individus et aux pays. Les organisations du droit, de l’autre côté, agissent 
comme les règles secondaires parce qu’ils créent un système duquel les normes peuvent 
émerger.69 Cependant, en proposant cette théorie, Auby présente aussi des soucis avec une 
approche trop simple parce la création du droit international reste un processus compliqué. La 
complication principale, selon lui, est un problème de distinction. La distinction entre les 
législateurs et les exécutifs qui existe au niveau national n’existe pas si clairement au niveau 
international. Similairement, la distinction entre le niveau national et le niveau international n’est 
pas toujours claire ; il y a une « mélange de droit international et de droit interne. »70 Par 
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conséquent, les normes qui sont créées dans le système international sont souvent très générales 
parce qu’elles doivent s’appliquer aux plusieurs pays avec des systèmes juridiques différents. 
Alors, il y a des grandes divergences au niveau national parce que les pays peuvent interpréter 
les mêmes normes dans les façons différents.71 Cet argument est pertinent à ce projet parce qu’il 
suggère qu’il y a des facteurs au niveau national qui mènent aux interprétations différents aux 
pays quand ils sont confrontés avec les mêmes normes internationales.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter illustrates a theoretical shift in how scholars approach the topic of 
international law. This theoretical shift is primarily the result of recent globalization, the increase 
global interactions, especially between individuals and businesses. Interactions continue to 
transcend state borders and involve non-state actors, leaving traditional international law, or the 
laws governing the actions of sovereign states, increasingly outdated. As some scholars, such as 
Daniel Bethlehem and Rafael Domingo, highlight the downfalls with the current international 
legal system, other scholars, such as Phillip Jessup and Harold Koh, propose “transnational law” 
as a better theoretical framework for understanding and governing global interactions. Harold 
Koh also proposes the theory of transnational legal process, in which international law is created 
and subsequently internalized within domestic law. The French literature provides a similar 
perspective on international law, although Auby’s analysis of globalization and international law 
provides a more positive outlook on how international normative law functions within the 
current system. While French scholarship has not addressed transnational law in the manner that 
Anglophone scholarship has, the discussions of international law by both Auby and Kolb touch 
on many of the same key notions of transnational law, such as the role of international norms and 
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the process of internalization. This suggests that the core ideas of transnational law are more 
widespread globally than they may seem; there may simply be an issue of scholars 
internationally not yet adopting the term “transnational”. Overall, Koh’s theory of transnational 
legal process provides the best framework for understanding my own question, as it looks at how 
international and domestic laws interact. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
 This project seeks to understand the relationship between domestic and international law, 
with special attention to political culture’s effect on this relationship. Although traditional 
scholarship on international law has suggested a positivist, top-down approach to international 
law, in which considerable tension exists between international laws and the national laws 
created by sovereign states, Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process suggests a more 
fluid relationship between the two forms of law. Koh’s theory suggests a more a cyclical and 
normative manner of understanding international (or ‘transnational’) law in which different 
national laws and norms converge to influence the creation of international law. These 
international laws are in turn internalized back into domestic legal systems for a more 
standardized recognition of international norms. Because I am most interested in the second part 
of this cycle, how international norms are incorporated into domestic law, my study employs a 
careful analysis of the current international standards concerning privacy and technology as well 
as how law in France and the United States responds to these questions.1 However, it is not only 
the differences between international and domestic privacy law, or between French and 
American privacy law, that are of interest but how political culture affects these difference. I 
argue that aspects of a state’s political culture, rather than solely that state’s international 
standing or national security interests, impact the level of consistency between domestic and 
international law.  
To test this relationship my research design includes three variables (Figure 1). The 
independent variable for this study is international law and norms. Because this project looks at 
privacy law applicable to both France and the United States I look to international law applicable 
to both countries, more specifically, resolutions and reports originating from the United Nations. 
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This variable is derived from three different texts, as noted in Chapter One: Article 12 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, which recognizes a right to privacy as a 
human right,2 the United Nations’ resolution on December 18, 2013, which recognized the need 
for a specified “right to privacy in the digital age,3 and the United Nations resolution on 
November 25, 2014, which created greater legal protection for this right to privacy.”4 My 
dependent variable is domestic law, which I will study through French and American appellate 
court decisions focusing on privacy issues related to technology. I chose to analyze court 
decisions because I argue judicial decisions better reflect changes in a more politically neutral 
application of political culture to legal questions than legislation would, as the legislative branch, 
affected by the electoral process, is more vulnerable to varying political influences. Court 
decisions, being in theory more insulated from current politics, weigh current law and legal 
principles in the context of the greater constitutional and cultural values on which the country 
was built in order to address current legal questions. 
 
To clearly study how the relationship between international and domestic law is affected 
by culture, my research design includes political culture as a conditional variable. While 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variable 
Figure 1: Research Design 










‘political culture’ has been defined and interpreted in numerous ways depending on the purpose 
of the study, I largely base my conditional variable on the definition by Sidney Verba, who, in 
the 1960s, was one of the early scholars to analyze political culture as a political science 
phenomenon. Verba argues that political culture does not refer to the specific political 
institutions within a state, but rather “a system of beliefs about political interaction and political 
institutions.”5 Several decades later, in further defining a theory of political culture, Gabriel 
Almond expands on the ideas of scholars such as Verba to create four ways in which the theory 
can explain political culture, two of which are relevant to my own study. First, “political culture 
has cognitive, effective and evaluative components... [in other words] it includes knowledge and 
beliefs about political reality, feelings with respect to politics and commitments to political 
values.”6 This explanation bears some resemblance to Verba’s definition as it relates to the 
factors encompassing political culture. Second, Almond discusses the ramifications of political 
culture, noting, “political culture affects political and governmental structure and performance; it 
constraints it, but surely does not determine. The causal arrows between culture and structure and 
performance go both ways.”7 Political culture is thus not only a descriptive factor in political 
science, but can also influence political outcomes. Using political culture as a conditional 
variable in my study as a means to understand different domestic laws is pursuant of these 
conclusions. 
To more specifically conceptualize political culture in the context of my research 
question, I draw from the works of Verba and Almond to define political culture as the 
foundational legal doctrines or the constitutions from which a state is governed. This follows the 
two general definitions of political culture forwarded by Verba and Almond: the structure of the 
political system and how citizens perceive and interact with this system. A constitution follows 
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the first definition because it determines the entire structure of the government within a state. It 
also reflects societal perceptions of the government because a constitution, at least within the two 
countries I am analyzing, is created by representatives from the society that it governs. While 
this definition of political culture is not necessarily broad enough to be applicable to all research, 
it does apply the general definitions within political science scholarship in a manner that is 
relevant to a legally based study. To choose the documents, I look to the current constitution 
within each state, as well as the primary document identifying human rights. For the United 
States I will use the U.S. Constitution, written in 1789, and the Bill of Rights, written in 1791.8 
In France I study The Declaration of the Rights of Man, which was written in 1789 and acts as 
the Preamble to the first constitution, written in 1791, and the current constitution, which was 
written in 1958.9 Although France’s constitution is the French Republic’s fifth constitution, and 
thus more recently written than the U.S. Constitution, the use of both French documents will 
illustrate both the core foundational principles of the French Republic, as well as the current 
political structure. To analyze the political culture within each state, I look to the nature of each 
document (when it was written, the context for its creation) as well as the relevant philosophical 
and theoretical influences on each, as this second consideration highlight which ideologies were 
held to be culturally significant at the time of the document’s creation. 
To operationalize the dependent variable, I use judicial decisions from each country’s 
highest federal courts which have applied privacy law to legal questions related to technology. 
Because this project seeks to analyze the effects of a conditional variable, political culture, I 
sought to keep the dependent variable as consistent as possible for the two cases. Therefore, I 
looked at a narrow class of privacy cases, specifically those related to possible infringements of 
privacy as a result of more technologically advanced methods of surveillance, such as 
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wiretapping and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) tracking. I also include cases in which more 
advanced technology increases the scope of police search or seizure, for example the search of 
cell phones and laptop computers.  
To search for cases I use the case law database on LexisNexis® Academic for U.S. cases, 
and Legifrance and Juricaf, two online French case law databases, for French cases. I search for 
terms such as “privacy” and “technology”, or in the case of the French databases, “la vie privée” 
and “technologie”. In order to prevent significant lurking variables, such as the influence of now-
obsolete legal principles and outdated technology, I created temporal boundaries for my case 
selection. However, I could not create too rigid of temporal bounds because questions related to 
privacy and technology do not reach the supreme courts of both countries too frequently. It was 
thus necessary to have a somewhat broader timeframe in order to have a sufficient number of 
cases to analyze and I limited my cases to those occurring in the past thirty years. Although thirty 
years still allows for the possibility of lurking variables it strikes a balance between decreasing 
this possibility while also allowing for a more in-depth analysis of privacy concerns surrounding 
technology. I made one exception to this rule, allowing one U.S. case from 1967 because it acted 
as such a landmark case for judicial recognition of privacy in relation to new technology. For the 
United States I analyze the following four Supreme Court cases: Katz v. United States (1967), 
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001), United States v. Jones (2011), and Riley v. California (2014). The 
four cases from the French Court of Cassation, which are named numerically, are: 86-90297 
(1987), 10-11777 (2011), 11-84308 (2011), and 12-82391 (2014).  
To measure the dependent variable, I use a standard set of questions for each case, as this 
method ensures more standardized results while also allowing room for legal interpretation. The 
method therefore acts as somewhat of a hybrid between more abstract comparative legal analysis 
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and more concrete content analysis, as each method has its advantages and disadvantages. In 
their comprehensive study of content analysis of judicial decisions Mark Hall and Ronald Wright 
highlight that content analysis is ideal when each case is equally influential, and when 
determining the outcome of cases, or the specific legal principles used.10 By looking only at 
these superficial aspects of a case, researchers can boost the internal validity of their study 
through the use of coding to decrease bias. However, failing to look at why outcomes are decided 
can decrease the external validity of the study.11 Hall and Wright therefore note that content 
analysis can be a useful tool for augmenting traditional legal analysis, especially in descriptive 
legal studies.12 Because I want to determine a standardized set of data about court decisions, but 
also understand the general reasoning behind these decisions, a mix of content analysis and 
general legal analysis was the best method. To strike the balance between these methods I 







These questions provide a standardized view of the cases that will simplify the process of 
comparing cases from two different legal systems. Furthermore, using this set of questions rather 
than pure content analysis provides a more comprehensive understanding of exactly how the 
Court is interpreting privacy as a constitutional issue.  
 
1. What was the constitutional question reviewed by the Court? 
2. What was the outcome of the case? Did the Court rule in favor of protecting 
privacy or against it? 
3. What tests and/or legal principles did the Court use? 
4. Did the Court cite any preceding cases from this study; if so, did they expand on 
or move away from the previous holding? 
5. What elements of political culture are evident in the Court’s decision? 
6. Did the Court cite any international laws or international courts? 
Figure 2: Questions Guiding the Reading of Privacy Cases 
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 Upon completing my examination of the conditional and dependent variables in Chapters 
Four through Six, I delve into an analysis of the researched variables in full. In other words, I 
examine what patterns exist in relation to privacy protections and recognitions in domestic court 
decisions, as well as the extent to which these protections are consistent with international 
norms. Although there are many facets of international norms, I use international laws from the 
United Nations as representative of what is held to be normal within the international community 
in relation to privacy law. Thus, in the context of my independent variable, international law and 
international norms become generally interchangeable. To measure this variable I draw from the 
three sources of international privacy law discussed in Chapter One: Article 12 of the UDHR, the 
U.N. report from June 30, 2014 on “the right to privacy in the digital age,” and finally the 
follow-up report from November 2014 further detailing the extent to which countries must 
protect privacy. From this analysis, I can fully test my hypothesis by determining to what degree 
differences in political culture account for inconsistencies between international and domestic 
privacy law in France and the United States. Although I cannot prove a causal relationship 
between political culture and the manner in which international norms are internalized, I am able 
to deduce correlations between political culture and the inconsistencies between domestic and 
international law.   
 
Résumé de la methodologie 
Dans ce projet, j’étudie comment la culture politique influence le niveau de cohérence 
entre le droit international et les lois nationales. Autrement dit, j’analyse comment la culture 
politique affecte le rapport entre le droit international et le droit national. Le design de recherche 
pour ce projet utilise trois variables. Ma variable indépendante est les normes internationales de 
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la vie privée. Pour déterminer ce que la communauté internationale considère comment la norme, 
j’utilise le droit international, plus spécifiquement les résolutions passées par les Nations Unies 
concernant la vie privée. Ma variable dépendante est les lois nationales. Puisqu’il existe plusieurs 
types de loi, j’étudie les décisions judiciaires à la place des lois passées par les législatures. Avec 
les décisions judiciaires je peux voir comment les interprétations de la vie privée évoluent et 
répondent à la nouvelle technologie. Pour examiner cette variable, j’utilise les cas de la Cour 
Suprême des Etats-Unis et la Cour de Cassation en France. Pour chaque pays j’analyse quatre cas 
judiciaires qui concernent l’applications des standards nationaux de la vie privée sur les 
technologiques spécifiques, par exemple, les écoutes téléphoniques, le pistage avec GPS, et le 
recherche des portables. 
 Ma variable conditionnelle est la culture politique. Comme les études des politologues 
suggèrent, plusieurs définitions de la culture politique existent. Mais, pour la culture politique au 
contexte de ce projet, la définition appropriée est la suivante : la fondation du système judiciaire, 
y compris les constitutions ou les autres doctrines qui créent le fond de la compréhension 
sociétale des concepts légaux. En étudiant la culture politique, ou plus spécifiquement ces 
fondations, on se tourne aux caractéristiques du pays comme le rôle du gouvernement, les droits 
donnés aux hommes et aux femmes, et comment les cours fédérales sont structurées. Pour les 
Etats-Unis, j’analyse la Constitution et la Déclaration de Droits, et pour la France j’étudie la 
Constitution de la Ve République et la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen. À part 
de considérer comment ces documents reflètent les structures et les rôles des branches 
judiciaires, j’examine aussi les idéologies populaires avec les auteurs des documents pour que je 
puisse mieux comprendre leurs implications culturelles. 
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Donc, je peux comparer non seulement comment les connaissances de la vie privée 
évoluent dans les deux pays mais aussi comment les deux pays appliquent différemment les 
normes de la vie privée aux même questions légales. La méthode générale employée dans cette 
étude est une analyse comparative de droit. Pour mieux mesurer et comparer les cas judiciaires, 
j’utilise une série standardisée de questions s’appliqueront à chaque cas (Figure 3). Ces questions 
seront liées aux principes légales sur la vie privée, aux concepts courants au niveau international 
sur le sujet, et à la culture politique. Cette série de questions donne plus de validité interne à 
l’étude parce qu’il y a des informations uniformes pour chaque cas. En mesurant la variable 
conditionnelle, la culture politique, j’utilise un type similaire d’analyse comparative pour 
examiner les constitutions de chaque état. Cependant, cette analyse de la variable conditionnelle 
sera avant l’analyse des cas juridiques pour que je puisse faire référence aux aspects spécifiques 
de culture politique pendant l’analyse des cas. Enfin, avec ces informations, j’analyse comment 
la culture politique se présente aux décisions juridiques, comment c’est différente entre les deux 
pays, et comment ces différences peuvent expliquer les incohérences entre les lois nationales et 
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1. Quelle est la question constitutionnelle revue par la Cour ? 
2. Quel est le résultat du cas ? Est-ce que la Cour a prononcé un jugement 
favorable ou opposé à la vie privée? 
3. Auxquels tests ou principes légaux la Cour a-t-elle recours ?  
4. La Cour cite-t-elle les cas précédents signifiants ; si oui, augmente ou a 
diminue les protections de la vie privée ? 
5. Quels éléments de la culture politique sont évidents dans la décision ? 
6. La Cour cite-t-elle des lois internationales ou des décisions des cours 
internationales ? 
Figure 3: Questions pour les cas judiciaires sur la vie privée 
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Chapter 4: An Analysis of Political Culture 
Introduction  
This study seeks to push beyond describing how international law may be internalized 
differently in states, to why international law is internalized differently. More specifically it will 
examine how political culture can influence this process by acting as a conditional variable on 
the relationship between international and national law. This chapter will establish an 
understanding of political culture in both the United States and France, as well as address how 
this political understanding may relate to an understanding of privacy. As noted in Chapter 
Three, political culture has been defined and studied in a myriad of ways depending on the focus 
of the project. Because this study seeks to understand how political culture affects judicial 
understandings of privacy, I turn to an analysis of political culture related to the principles and 
philosophical ideas on which the country was built. Although this is only one aspect of culture, 
this philosophical and historical approach highlights the cultural understandings of government, 
of the citizen, and of the relationship between the two, as well as how these understandings have 
permeated a culture’s political system and created a unique understanding of legal questions, 
such as those related to privacy. This historical angle is needed because, as Bernhard Grossfeld 
argues in his assessment of comparative law, “often the best explanation of a legal institution lies 
in its history rather than in its current operation.”1 Therefore, to fully understand a country’s 
unique cultural understanding of the role of its legal and political institutions, it is necessary to 
study the philosophical and theoretical concepts that influenced and inspired the creation of these 
institutions. 
To gain this historical and philosophical understanding of political culture, I analyze the 
founding documents from each country; including their constitutions and their declaration of 
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rights. An analysis of these documents is an effective method for understanding first, the general 
principles on which each country was founded and structured, and second, the nuanced 
philosophical undertones that make each system unique. For the United States, I analyze the 
Constitution of the United States, including the Bill of Rights; for France, I analyze both the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (La Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et 
du Citoyen) and the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the current governing constitution. By 
studying the Bill of Rights separately from the U.S. Constitution, the analysis of U.S. documents 
can mirror that of the French documents, where the citizens’ rights were recorded in a separate 
document. This also recognizes that Bill of Rights, although now considered a part of the U.S. 
Constitution, was written two years after the Constitution was adopted. Aside from studying the 
documents themselves, I also use secondary sources, specifically the works of scholars who 
specialize in the philosophical and theoretical influences present during these eras. Drawing from 
these sources will provide a more nuanced understanding of the cultural implications of each 
document. In each document, I look first to the context in which it was written, for example, who 
wrote it, why it was created, and most importantly the political and philosophical theories that 
inspired its core ideas. I then turn to a discussion of the actual content of the document as 
relevant to my study, looking at how the structure of the government system or recognition of 
protected rights provides insight into the political culture of the country. 
 
United States 
The Constitution of the United States 
 The Constitution of the United States was written in 1787 by an assembly of state 
delegates seeking to respond to the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation, the previous 
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governing document.2 Before delving into the contents of the Constitution, it is first necessary to 
understand the context of its creation. After declaring independence from Britain, the colonies 
that later became the United States had the difficult task of structuring a new government. In 
their book on the origins and development of the Constitution, Alfred Kelly, Winifred Harbison 
and Herman Belz highlight the significance of republicanism in the political order at the time. 
Republicanism, or the theory that the government should be a public matter with an emphasis on 
the well-being of society over the well-being of a specific group, was a new but prevailing theory 
during the colonial and revolutionary era.3 Aside from being accepted as option for Americans 
previously under the rule of a monarch across the Atlantic, a republican government was also a 
logical step. The United States lacked a titled aristocracy, such as those existing in many 
European countries. Thus, without the British crown, “the popular element [was] the only basis 
of government.”4 Although republicanism was popular, it was not the prevailing theory behind 
the Articles of Confederation, which created a “confederal union” of states, each of which had its 
own Constitution.5 Under this system, each state was recognized as its own sovereign entity, 
while the central motivation behind having a single “United States” was a need for a unified 
defense against potential aggression from Britain and other external threats.6 Constitutional law 
scholars Kelly, Harbison, and Belz argue that it was a lack of republicanism, and not a lack of 
responsibility at the national level, as commonly believed, that created the weaknesses of the 
Articles of Confederation and inspired the creation of the Constitution.7 
 Before analyzing the effects of republicanism, and other influential theories, on the 
Constitution itself, I would first like to examine the dominant theories of this period and how 
they became a part of the founding fathers’ political foundations. To understand this context for 
framing of the Constitution, David Bederman turns to a brief analysis of higher education in the 
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United States during the eighteenth century, as the subjects and authors studied at college often 
represent the general influences on the elite, who then affect the population as a whole. 
Bederman notes that the main universities in the colonies, those attended by the founding fathers, 
focused heavily on the classics, particularly Greek and Roman philosophy. Many Framers 
“regarded the classical tradition as granting useful knowledge and valuable historic precedent on 
what John Adams called ‘the divine science of politics.’”8  
It was from the study of the success of the Greeks and Romans, two famous republican 
powers, that led Adams to ultimately embrace republicanism.9 In learning about former 
governments who followed this doctrine, the founding fathers were also able to learn from some 
of the shortcomings of those political systems. For example, Adams noticed that a downfall for 
Rome was the lack of separation between the executive, judicial and legislative branches, and the 
exact responsibilities of each was never sufficiently defined. The Romans assumed that having a 
“mixed government” with representation from all groups would act as a method of checks and 
balances, an assumption that unfortunately often led to an abuse of power.10 Therefore not only 
did the classics provide a theoretical and philosophical foundation for the key political actors in 
American, but they also provided opportunities to learn from the successes and failures of similar 
governments. This historical perspective gave the Framers of the Constitution the ability to more 
effectively and successfully apply classical philosophy to a new political system. 
 Aside from the classics themselves, the founding fathers often cited several secondary 
writers on the classics. Montesquieu, for example, was a popular influence as his 1748 work, 
L’Esprit des lois (The Spirit of the Laws) was one of the most referenced works on the classics 
cited by the Framers.11 Montesquieu was primarily a republican, and The Spirit of Laws details 
the several ways in which republics may effectively govern.12 However, in discussing this legal 
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system, Montesquieu brought up one of the central problems facing the Framers: republics are 
often geographically small, thus there was the question of whether this model would even be 
attainable for the United States.13 The Framers also turned to Montesquieu’s model of a 
“Confederate Republic”, which is based on the theory that there is a net benefit from creating a 
confederacy out of small, previously independent states. A union of states increases the ability of 
the states to respond to internal and external threats, without losing the benefits of a small, more 
localized government.14 Through this model, the Framers could use a federalist approach to 
apply the advantages of a republican government on a larger scale. These works, whether 
classical or works building off of classical works, demonstrate a central political ideology at the 
time of the American Revolution. The Framers were primarily supporters of creating a republic, 
while also drawing from Montesquieu’s logic on federalism, as a means of applying 
republicanism to a larger geographical area.  
However, it is important to note the difference between republicanism and democracy in 
this context, as many of the founding fathers were in support of a republic but staunchly opposed 
to creating a democracy. At the time of the framing of the Constitution, democracies were widely 
regarded as short-lived and unsuccessful, or as James Madison opined: “Democracies have been 
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal 
security, or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives as they have 
been violent in their deaths.”15 What, then, is the major difference between a republic and a 
democracy, at least in relation to how the terms were employed at the end of the eighteenth 
century? At the most basic level, democracies were considered governments ruled by the people, 
whereas republics were considered governments comprised of representatives for the people. 
Although republics could be less reflective of actual popular opinion on certain topics, they had 
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the advantage of providing greater stability.16 During Thomas Jefferson’s presidency the United 
States moved closer toward democracy, as he was a greater supporter of democratic principles; 
however, the Constitution was still based on republican, not democratic theory.17 
With this theoretical foundation, I turn now to the Constitution itself. The document is 
comprised of seven articles, plus a preamble and the Bill of Rights.18 The central articles outline 
the powers of each branch of government, detailing a system of careful checks and balances that 
incorporates some of Adams’ concerns regarding the failures of the Roman checks and balances 
systems. Of these central articles, the most relevant to this study are Articles III and IV which 
detail the power of the judiciary and the relationship between federal and state governments 
respectively. Most notable of Article III is Section 1, which creates one Supreme Court, and 
recognizes the ability of the Congress to establish inferior courts as necessary. Section 2 touches 
on the jurisdiction of the judicial branch, such as the types of cases the judicial power has the 
authority to rule on and when the Supreme Court is given original or appellate jurisdiction. 
However, it is important note Sanford Levinson’s observation that nowhere in the Constitution 
are the courts explicitly given judicial review.19 In comparison with the executive and legislative 
branches, the judicial branch is given little explicit constitutional power. Instead, much of the 
judicial branch’s power comes from the Judiciary Act of 1789. Although this Act is, of course, 
separate from the Constitution itself, it is still worth noting because it used the power given to 
Congress by Article III to establish actual courts from abstract constitutional concepts. It is from 
this Act that the powers given to the judicial branch went from abstract notions to tangible 
duties, and an actual Supreme Court was created.20  
Although Article IV relates less directly to the functions of the judiciary, it is an 
important article for understanding how the political theories previously mentioned actually 
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became a part of the Constitution, and therefore a part of American political culture. Most 
notable in Article IV is Section 4, which reads: “The United States shall guarantee to every State 
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against 
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot 
be convened), against domestic Violence.”21 This section reflects two important aspects of the 
prevailing political views at the end of the eighteenth century. First, it specifically designates a 
republican form of government, not a democracy.22 Second, the recognition of both state 
government and the federal government’s duty to protect its states also follows Montesquieu’s 
theories surrounding federalism. Although exact language for these concepts may have evolved 
over time, for instance the evolution of the terms ‘republican’ and ‘democratic’, these theories 
remain a part of the Constitution and therefore a part of the United States’ political culture. 
It is also worth noting in relation to the Constitution, how the Framers’ experience with 
legal systems influenced the role of the courts in the United States. As a former British colony, 
the newly formed United States adopted the standards of English common law. Common law is 
best understood as “judge-made law”, where the courts have the ability to extend or limit law 
through the use of precedent. Therefore, to understand law required not only understanding the 
original written code, but also the judicial interpretations of the law.23 As such, any written laws, 
and therefore the Constitution, act as dynamic legal documents with the capacity to evolve 
through interpretation and application. 
 
The Bill of Rights   
 Because the Bill of Rights was written two years after the Constitution, it draws from 
many of the same philosophical and political theories. However, it is important to note why the 
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Bill of Rights came into existence. Garrett Epps, a law professor at The University of Oregon, 
argues that the Framers were, “far more concerned with making sure that the government had 
enough power to survive than with ensuring that it recognized the rights of the people.”24 The 
need to recognize individual rights and protect them from government intrusion was a secondary 
consideration, primarily led by James Madison. Madison initially proposed twelve amendments, 
although only ten were actually ratified. Former Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell articulates 
the significance of the amendments formally ratified as a part of the Bill of Rights. These ten 
amendments are based on the limitation of federal power, not state power. Madison’s 
amendment applying these rights as protections from the states was never ratified; it was only in 
later judicial considerations that the Supreme Court held the Bill of Rights protected citizens 
from local government.25 This represents the importance, at least initially, of state autonomy and 
stability over the protection of the individual, thus reflecting some of the core tenets of 
republicanism and federalism. In other words, the ability of the states to make decisions within 
their own borders took precedent over the universal protection of individual liberties. 
In turning to the actual content of the Bill of Rights, Epps notes three important 
characteristics. First, the document primarily recognizes negative liberties, a term used by 
twelfth-century philosopher Isaiah Berlin to describe protection from certain government 
action.26 For example, the First Amendment protects citizens from government infringement on 
their freedom of speech, of the press, and to practice their religion, the Fourth Amendment 
protects citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” the Eighth Amendment protects 
citizens from “cruel and unusual punishments.”27 This is in contrast to positive rights or liberties, 
or the right to be provided a liberty or service by the government.28 Second, the concept of 
equality appears nowhere within the original ten amendments. As a result, Epps argues that the 
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Bill of Rights acted as, “a set of limitations on the government of a republic that permitted vast 
inequality on the basis of class, sex and race.”29 These inequalities did not begin to be addressed 
until 1868, with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, Epps highlights the 
vagueness and indeterminate nature of much of the language within the amendments, therefore 
leaving the Bill of Rights open to great debate and interpretation. For example, he notes that the 
Fifth Amendment discusses “due process of law,” the Sixth a “speedy” trial, as well as other 
similarly vague terms in other amendments that are not explicitly defined.30 This vagueness is a 
significant consideration when looking at political culture, especially in my next chapter when I 
begin to analyze how political culture is reflected in recent judicial interpretations of privacy. 
There must be a distinction made between current understandings of these amendments, and the 
actual original language. By showing the evolution of these concepts, it will be possible to 
understand the cultural implications of judicial decisions. 
 In analyzing the Bill of Rights, it is also worth noting that the concept of privacy is never 
mentioned. Rather than detail a positive right to privacy, the Bill of Rights instead provides 
certain negative rights that have been interpreted to also provide an implicit right to privacy. For 
example, the Fourth Amendment recognizes that “the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”31 
Read literally, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, thus securing a negative right from government intrusion into one’s private affairs. 
Although it does not explicitly address a right to privacy, it does provide an implicit recognition 
of private affairs, whether it be one’s own private home or papers and effects. It is this implicit 
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right to privacy that the Supreme Court later recognized in cases such as Katz v. United States, 
and has continued to apply to privacy and technology issues since that landmark cases.32 It is 
therefore, this aspect of the Bill of Rights that will be particularly relevant for my study. 
 
Conclusion 
 With this overview of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the question then becomes, 
what do these documents highlight in terms of political culture, particularly political culture as 
relevant to privacy concerns? A reflection upon the political and philosophical influences, 
primarily the classics, on the founding fathers demonstrates the role of republican and federal 
theories in framing the Constitution. In applying these theories to the Constitution, the Framers 
sought to create a republic that struck a balance between political stability and the fair 
representation of the people. Through a federalist approach, the Framers could also find a 
balance between the advantages of a central government, while also retaining a level of state 
autonomy. This autonomy is particularly visible in the Bill of Rights, and the lack of constriction 
on state action that it initially allowed. The Bill of Rights also reflects a focus on negative rights, 
or a protection from government intrusion. However, as noted above, many of these rights were 
vaguely construed using terms that were never explicitly defined. This vagueness leaves the Bill 
of Rights open to judicial interpretation, as the Supreme Court acts upon the powers given by 
both Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789. Overall, both the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights represent a concern about federal intrusion, whether on the autonomy of the states or the 
personal liberties of the individual.  
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France 
 Nous nous tournons maintenant à une recherche de la culture politique en France, avec 
l’étude des deux documents gouvernementaux qui sont centraux au pays français. Dans un 
premier temps, nous analysons la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, qui a été 
passée en 1789 et donc précède la constitution actuelle en France, qui a été passée en 1958. 
Puisque ce premier document était un des premiers résultats concrets de la Révolution française 
et représente les changements de mentalités pendant la Révolution, il est nécessaire de discuter 
les influences politiques et philosophiques sur cette période historique de la nation française 
avant de commencer l’analyse du document soi-même. Puis, dans un deuxième temps nous 
analysons la Constitution de la Ve République pour comprendre comment ces influences 
politiques ont évolué et sont reflétées dans la constitution actuelle. 
 
La Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen 
 Il reste un grand débat sur les influences principales pendant la Révolution : quels 
penseurs étaient signifiants, comment leurs idées étaient utilisées, et à quel point ils ont influencé 
les révolutionnaires. Cependant, il y a deux penseurs de cette période qui sont reconnus comme 
des influences signifiantes : Montesquieu et Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Comme nous l’avons 
mentionné dans la partie précédente, Montesquieu a proposé plusieurs études nouvelles de la 
politique dans son œuvre De l’esprit des lois, publiée pour la première fois en 1748. Dans cette 
œuvre, Montesquieu définit deux idées principales qui ont été utilisées pendant la Révolution 
française. Premièrement, il réaffirme sa reconnaissance des lois naturelles qui existent comme les 
libertés universelles des individus mais aussi les privilèges des certains, une idée qui vient des 
théoriciens classiques. Il affirme que « le monde intelligent soit aussi bien gouverné que le 
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monde physique, » ainsi il y a « aussi des lois qui par leur nature sont invariables. »33 Une de ces 
lois naturelles est « le désir de vivre en société. »34 Alors, Montesquieu décrit comment les 
hommes ont utilisé les lois naturelles pour créer une société basée sur les lois positives. Il y a, 
selon lui, trois types de droit qui gouvernent les états. D’abord, le droit des gens dicte comment 
les membres des états doivent interagir. Ensuite, le droit politique impose des règles sur le 
gouvernement de chaque état, et protège ainsi le rapport entre les citoyens et l’état. Enfin, le droit 
civil régit « le rapport que tous les citoyens ont entre eux. »35 Par conséquent, les lois naturelles 
influencent la création des tous les types de droit, qui sont compris comment les systèmes des 
lois, positifs.  
De ce fait, ses idées sur le droit naturel et ses observations des systèmes différents font 
avancer aussi une nouvelle compréhension de l’intersection entre le droit positif et le droit 
naturel. Plus spécifiquement, il voit les deux types de droit comme moins divisés que l’on ne l’a 
pensé.36 Les lois naturelles créent la base de tous les types de droit qui gouvernent les hommes, 
mais elles seules créent des systèmes de droit différents à cause des cultures différentes, et donc 
les interprétations variées. Même si on tente d’appliquer les lois naturelles, et donc les concepts 
de la justice universelle, on peut avoir encore des lois défectueuses. Les lois sont toujours 
influencées par les conditions et les besoins de la société qu’il gouverne et par la volonté variée 
des individus qui le créent. Pour s’adapter à cette questions, on doit ajuster les lois aux 
conditions uniques de la société pour que les principes universelles de la justice puissent exister 
et protéger les libertés des individus.37  
 Cette reconnaissance du gouvernement unique qui est nécessaire pour l’avancement des 
lois naturelles mène au deuxième concept principal de Montesquieu dans son œuvre, l’idée de la 
séparation des pouvoirs. Pendant ces études des systèmes légaux différents il et donc les 
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distributions des pouvoirs qui sont les plus effectives.38 L’importance de la séparation des 
pouvoirs est une idée bien discutée dans la partie de notre étude sur la culture américaine, mais il 
faut revisiter le contexte des libertés individuelles, et puis de la Révolution française en générale. 
Montesquieu reconnaît l’importance des droits de l’individu et soutient un système de pouvoir 
bien équilibré parce qu’il peut mieux protéger ces libertés.39 La séparation des pouvoirs fournit 
aussi une stabilité pour le gouvernement sans créer le despotisme, un concept qu’il continue à 
condamner.40 Montesquieu pense que la politique et l’exercice raisonnable du pouvoir sont « le 
lieu de compromis entre les intérêts des individus et le fait de la société. »41 Dans ce sens, il 
représente un modèle de libéralisme plus modéré, l’équilibre entre la stabilité gouvernementale 
et la protection des libertés individuelles. 
Montesquieu propose, certainement, de nouveaux concepts de droit et de gouvernement 
dans De l’esprit des lois, mais le plus grand problème est que son œuvre était principalement une 
étude sur les systèmes de droit. Il détaille les problèmes qu’il voit et les théories très générales 
qu’il croit être les plus efficaces mais il ne donne pas de recommandation concrète qui peuvent 
être utilisé par les révolutionnaires.42 Dans ce sens, Montesquieu fournit une connaissance des 
systèmes de droit différents et questionne les formes de gouvernement nouvelles. Cette 
perspective est intéressante parce qu’il peut expliquer comment les idées de Montesquieu ont été 
utilisées des façons très différents par plusieurs parties pendant la Révolution. Pour les 
révolutionnaires, les idées de Montesquieu ont été complétées par les théories des autres 
penseurs célèbres de cette période; une des ces influences politiques, et peut être l’influence la 
plus notable, est Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
Rousseau était une influence célèbre principalement à cause de son œuvre Du Contrat 
Social, publié en 1762. Comme avec des autres théoriciens, les spécialistes de l’histoire de la 
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Révolution ne sont pas d’accord à l’égard d’influence exacte de Rousseau, mais c’est presque 
universellement accepté qu’il a été une influence très signifiante. Roger Barny, par exemple, 
soutient que Rousseau était une plus grande influence que Montesquieu, en disant que « la 
‘bible’ des révolutionnaires, dès le début, ce n’est pas l’Esprit des lois, mais le Contrat 
social. »43 Du Contrat Social affirme des notions d’une société égale et démocratique qui 
deviennent des piliers des théories des révolutionnaires française.44  Mais qu’est-ce que c’est, 
cette idée de rousseauisme qui était souvent citée pendant la Révolution ? En général, Rousseau 
propose qu’il y a un ordre social qui « est un droit sacré qui sert de base à tous les autres. »45 
Dans ce sens, la société doit être réglée comme une association des individus. S’il y a trop de 
pouvoir au chef du gouvernement qui traitent les citoyens comme des esclaves dépourvues des 
libertés individuelles, ce n’est plus un gouvernement légitime.  
En bref, Rousseau reconnaît la différence « entre soumettre une multitude et régir une 
société. »46 C’est la responsabilité de la société de s’assurer que le gouvernement aussi que les 
autres membres de la société demeurent le contrat social.47 Cependant, il y a un compromis entre 
la protection de l’ordre social et les libertés individuelles qui sont indépendantes des autres. 
Rousseau affirme que, « c’est qu’au lieu de détruire l’égalité naturelle, le pacte fondamental 
substitue au contraire une égalité morale et légitime à ce que la nature avait pu mettre d’inégalité 
physique entre les hommes, et que, pouvant être inégaux en force ou en génie, ils deviennent 
tous égaux par convention et de droit. »48 L’ordre social qu’il propose crée l’égalité entre tous les 
hommes par un gouvernement qui s’agit comme une association volontaire des citoyens. 
En outre, un autre aspect Du contrat social qui est important pour la Révolution était le 
concept du moralisme, lié aux libertés naturelles et civiles. Rousseau souligne l’importance des 
libertés comme une partie nécessaire de l’humanité parce que, « c’est ôter toute moralité à ses 
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actions que d’ôter toute liberté à sa volonté. »49 S’il ne reconnaîtrait pas d’autonomie de 
l’individu et le concept de la volonté générale, le gouvernement perdrait sa légitimité.50 Pour 
Rousseau, l’étude de l’histoire et des systèmes de gouvernance doit inclure la considération de la 
moralité, spécifiquement quand on étudie la situation des hommes. Cette perspective a influencé 
certains révolutionnaires de placer « cette exigence morale… au cœur de la politique. »51 Ce 
moralisme peut expliquer aussi l’importance de la reconnaissance des droits de l’homme avant la 
création d’un gouvernement structuré ; la moralité exige la justice, car, sans la justice, le 
gouvernement n’a plus de pouvoir légitime.  
Rousseau, quand on le compare à Montesquieu, a une perspective politique plus libérale, 
et pour l’époque, presque radicale. Il prend certaines des mêmes idées de Montesquieu 
concernant les lois naturelles, et donc les libertés naturelles, mais il les utilise pour proposer une 
nouvelle connaissance du gouvernement. Tandis que Montesquieu garde un peu la structure du 
gouvernement, et donc l’influence aristocratique de laquelle il profite, Rousseau décrit un 
gouvernement plus interdépendant et général. Par conséquent, le rousseauisme conteste l’idée 
française de l’aristocratie, un aspect culturelle qui était une tradition importante dans l’histoire 
gouvernementale de la France. Un rejet de cette structure gouvernement était ainsi radical pour 
l’époque. 
Mais pourquoi ces perspectives sont-elles importantes pour la création de la Déclaration 
des droit de l’homme et du citoyen ? D’abord on doit considérer le contexte de cette création. La 
Déclaration ne reconnaît pas simplement des libertés individuelles, elle marque le premier pas 
dans le processus de constitutionnalisation, le changement complet et idéologique du 
gouvernement français. La reconnaissance des lois naturelles est particulièrement importante 
pour cette raison. La Révolution française renverse tout l’ordre social et politique et les 
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révolutionnaires avaient besoin de logique pour ce rejet. Avec un appel aux droits naturels, les 
révolutionnaires pouvaient justifier l’abondamment d’un système de gouvernance considéré 
d’être tyrannique parce qu’ils cherchaient à rétablir l’ordre naturel et les droits universels des 
citoyens.52 Les théories de Montesquieu et de Rousseau concernant le droit naturel, et les libertés 
universelles qu’il protège, donnent la légitimité à la cause révolutionnaire française. 
À part de contexte de la création de la Déclaration, les théories philosophiques de cette 
période sont aussi évidentes dans les droits protégés par la déclaration. Même le préambule 
désigne les articles suivants comme « les droits naturels, inaliénables et sacrés de l'Homme. »53 
Similairement, Article 1er affirme que « les hommes naissent de demeurent libres et égaux en 
droits, » un des concepts principaux de l’idée rousseauiste des droits universels.54 Ce qui est 
aussi important dans l’analyse de ce document est la reconnaissance des droits du pays, l’idée de 
la souveraineté, et donc le rapport entre l’État et le citoyen.55 Ce document reconnaît les droits 
des individus, mais il reconnaît aussi ceux des citoyens. Article 15, par exemple, constate, « La 
Société a le droit de demander compte à tout Agent public de son administration. »56 Cette 
distinction représente l’importance culturelle pendant la Révolution d’avoir des libertés 
individuelles protégées mais aussi une société bien cohésive qui peut se défendre face à un 
gouvernement trop restrictif ou oppressif. Le concept de la vie privée, comme détaillé dans cette 
déclaration, reflète aussi cette équilibre entre l’individu et la société. Article 17 constate que « la 
propriété étant un droit inviolable et sacré, nul ne peut en être privé, si ce n'est lorsque la 
nécessité publique, légalement constatée, l'exige évidemment, et sous la condition d'une juste et 
préalable indemnité. »57 Cette reconnaissance est limitée à la propriété privée, mais elle note 
quand même que l’individu à le droit d’une vie loin de la domaine publique. Mais, en même 
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temps, ce droit n’est pas absolu et l’article souligne que ce droit peut être surpassé s’il y a assez 
de besoin commun. 
La Constitution de la Ve République 
 L’histoire gouvernementale française depuis la Révolution est un peu plus compliquée 
que l’histoire américaine, principalement parce que la France est maintenant sur sa cinquième 
république, et donc sa cinquième constitution. L’étude de cette constitution actuelle est logique 
parce qu’elle s’inspire toujours des idées fondamentales de la Révolution, surtout de celles qu’on 
voit aussi dans la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, mais aussi des changements 
culturels depuis le XVIIIe siècle. Pour que ce chapitre ne devienne pas une histoire considérable 
de la France entre 1791 (l’année du premier document constitutionnel) et 1958 (l’année de 
l’adoption de la constitution actuelle), je soulignerai seulement les changements les plus 
importants pour une connaissance générale de la culture politique.  
La Constitution de la Ve République (désormais appelée ‘la Constitution’) est 
essentiellement le résultat des suggestions de Charles de Gaulle, devenu le premier président de 
la Ve République. De Gaulle, avec le reste de la France, voit l’instabilité de la IV République 
parce que le pouvoir donné aux « coalitions changeantes des groupes parlementaire, » est 
imprévisible.58 La gouvernance était compliqué et les changements de régime passent souvent. 
Avec la création d’une nouvelle république, et donc un nouveau structure du gouvernement, la 
France cherche à créer plus de stabilité, particulièrement pour l’exécutif avec des mandats 
présidentiels plus durables.59 L’accent sur le pouvoir présidentiel est la tentative de Charles de 
Gaulle de protéger son poste s’il devient président.60 Ce changement représente aussi un 
déplacement idéologique concernant l’équilibre que Montesquieu a cherché entre la stabilité du 
régime et la protection des individus. Avec la Constitution de la Ve République, la France gagne 
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plus de stabilité contre moins de surveillance sur l’exécutif. Mais, même de Gaulle veux 
préserver cet équilibre et « respecter les principes et procédures démocratiques, » en mettant « la 
soumission finale du texte constitutionnel à la ratification populaire. »61 La Constitution a été 
promulguée en octobre 1958 et est comprise de quatre-vingt-neuf articles organisés en seize 
titres, ou catégories.62 
 À part de ce changement fondamental de la structure de l’exécutif, comment le système 
judiciaire est-il organisé sous la Constitution ?  La Cour de Cassation, la cour d’appel la plus 
haute en France, était déjà une partie du système judicaire, mais la Constitution de 1958 ajoute 
aussi le Conseil Constitutionnel sous le Titre VII du document. Avec ce corps, la branche 
judicaire prend deux responsabilités principales qui viennent des pouvoirs législatifs de la 
république précédente.63 Premièrement, le Conseil supervise le processus électoral du président, 
et quand nécessaire, celui des députés et des sénateurs, aussi que les ratifications.64 
Deuxièmement, le Conseil détermine la constitutionnalité des lois faites par les assemblées avant 
qu’ils soient entrées en application. Sous Article 62, « une disposition déclarée 
inconstitutionnelle … ne peut être promulguée ni mise en application. »65 Avec la création du 
Conseil Constitutionnel, le système judicaire prend la responsabilité pour une partie de la 
surveillance sur l’exécutif, et aussi les corps législatifs. Autrement dit, l’équilibre des pouvoirs 
est redistribué avec la nouvelle Constitution pour créer plus de stabilité, notamment certains 
pouvoirs législatifs sont transférés à l’exécutif et au système judicaire. Ce système représente 
l’importance des libertés des citoyens soutenue par Rousseau, avec la protection des valeurs de la 
Constitution, mais au même temps, la séparation et l’équilibre des pouvoirs que Montesquieu a 
détaillée. 
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Conclusion 
 La Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, ainsi que la Constitution 
de la Ve République, montrent l’importance de quelques aspects culturels de la Révolution 
française qui restent signifiants pour la culture politique actuel. Premièrement, la séparation des 
pouvoirs et les procédures de contrôles et de contrepoids restent importantes pour la protection 
des individus. Mais, ces procédures ne existent pas seulement au niveau gouvernemental ; la 
Déclaration reflète les idées rousseauistes concernant les responsabilité des citoyens, ou ils 
s’agissent comme une communauté unifié pour se défendre contre l’oppression possible du 
gouvernement. Deuxièmement, le droit naturel fournit le fond nécessaire pour la reconnaissance 
des libertés universelles pour que la France peut être, au niveau gouvernemental, une société 
d’égalité. 
 
Comparison and Conclusion 
 There are several distinctions that can be made between the political culture of the United 
States and that of France. Although both countries draw from similar influences, such as 
Montesquieu, and political theories, such as republicanism, the outcomes were considerably 
different. The United States came from colonial past, where the revolution provided the 
opportunity for self-governance. After gaining independence, it was the first time that the states 
were truly their own unified entity. Although Americans wanted to remain unified, there was still 
a strong sense of state autonomy, as this was the system they were most used to. The result was 
federal republic, where the states were unified for the sake of economic advantage and defense 
from exterior threats. However, as recognized in both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the 
states retained a certain degree of autonomy and individuality.  
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 This differs substantially from the outcome of the French Revolution, where the French 
people were revolting against an oppressive, and to a certain degree despotic, monarchical rule. 
The French people, like the Americans, wanted the opportunity to self-rule; however, they had a 
unified history that the Americans did not. Because of the strong and historical sense of French 
culture, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen emphasizes the unity of the 
French people as one populace. Similarly, because France sought to distance itself from 
oppressive rule, rather than distant colonial rule as was the case in the United States, there was a 
careful separation of powers and system of checks and balances to ensure the protection of civil 
liberties. Furthermore, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen details the role of 
French society in governmental oversight, ensuring that each citizen remain connected with the 
government of a country that once isolated its people.  
The French political culture is therefore, compared to that of the United States, more 
concerned about the internal threat of government oppression. Aside from the content of their 
documents, this concern is also evident in the chronology of the documents. Although there may 
certainly be numerous factors affecting this order it is certainly worth noting that in France, the 
recognition of individual rights came before the official structuring of the government, whereas 
in the United States, the Bill of Rights was created two years after the Constitution. In France, 
the significance of certain universal liberties also reflects the influence of theories of natural law 
when structuring the government. Although France recognizes the possibility of government 
oppression, the balance between a universal society and individual rights means that certain 
rights are not absolute. The right to private property, for example, is recognized in some form by 
both the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of Man; however, the French right more 
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specifically details the ability of the government to infringe on this right when there is sufficient 
societal need to do so.  
 A final consideration relates to the manner in which law is used in each country. 
Although both countries have similar procedures from creating legislation, and thus codification, 
the United States has a greater and more recent tie to English government; the influence of 
English common law is therefore a major and distinguishable aspect of the American judicial 
system. This is a particularly relevant difference when moving to the actual analysis of privacy 
cases in Chapter 4. For United States cases, there will be a far greater emphasis on precedent and 
how certain implicit understandings of privacy from the Bill of Rights have evolved and been 
applied to recent technology cases. On the French side, however, it is the law actually being 
applied that is of significance, and how these laws, as applied, reflect the evolution of the 
understanding of privacy. 
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Chapter 5: United States Privacy Case Law 
Introduction  
 In Chapter 4 I explored some of the key aspects of American political culture related to 
the republican structure of the government, the relationship between citizens and government as 
regulated by the Bill of Rights, and the governmental recognition of privacy concerns. This 
chapter takes these cultural understandings and analyzes how they are reflected in U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions about the privacy implications of new technology. In this sense, this chapter 
addresses a major aspect of my research question by reviewing how political culture is reflected 
in privacy norms within the United States. To analyze the relationship between political culture 
and privacy norms, I will analyze four United States Supreme Court decisions, each relating to a 
slightly different question concerning privacy and technology. I review Katz v. United States 
(1967) for investigative wiretapping, Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) for the publication of private 
communications, United States v. Jones (2011) for vehicle tracking via global positioning system 
(GPS) technology, and Riley v. California (2014) for searches of personal technology. While 
reading each case I apply a standard set of eight questions (see Figure 1) in order to assure 









7. What was the constitutional question reviewed by the Court? 
8. What was the outcome of the case? Did the Court rule in favor of protecting 
privacy or against it? 
9. What tests and/or legal principles did the Court use? 
10. Did the Court cite any significant preceding cases; if so, did they expand on 
or move away from the previous holding? 
11. What elements of political culture are evident in the Court’s decision? 
12. Did the Court cite any international laws or international courts? 
Figure 1: Questions Guiding the Reading of U.S. Privacy Cases 
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Katz v. United States (1967) 
 In Katz v. United States (1967), the Court ruled on the constitutionality of an 
investigation in which law enforcement collected evidence of an individual’s (hereafter, “the 
petitioner”) gambling endeavors without acquiring a warrant. The Court held that wiretapping 
constituted a search, and thus without a warrant infringed upon the Fourth Amendment 
protections of the petitioner. The Court’s reasoning stemmed from the holding that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people and not places. It is therefore insufficient to hold that an 
unreasonable search did not occur simply because a physical trespass did not take place by law 
enforcement. The Court, in referencing the previous case of Rios v. United States, reaffirmed that 
what an individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”1 An individual, such as the petitioner in this case, may therefore 
retain Fourth Amendment protections in public, so long as he seeks to preserve the information 
as private. The Court held that the petitioner had done so and therefore government action 
infringed upon this right, stating “the Government’s activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using 
the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”2 Fourth Amendment protections therefore apply to conversations taking place 
within the telephone booth; these words are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
 The determination for the Court was whether the search that occurred through recording 
protected information was reasonable; it was not, as law enforcement had not acquired a warrant. 
The Court has long recognized the importance of “detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate” 
prior to law enforcement conducting a search.3 Although this search dealt with an electronic 
device, rather than the search or seizure of tangible effects, the protections are equal and thus the 
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requirements by law enforcement are equal.4 Although there are certain exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, such as searches occurring at the time of arrest to secure the scene, none of these 
exceptions can apply to the current case.5 The government requested the creation of a new 
exception for cases such as the surveillance of a telephone. However, the Court rejected this 
request and cites the precedent case of Beck v. Ohio, holding that circumventing judicial 
approval, “bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable 
cause.”6 Furthermore, “bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves 
individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations ‘only in the discretion of the police.’”7 
The concern is therefore not only the ability of a neutral magistrate to recognize probable cause 
but also to determine the proper scope of a search. Removing this check would put individuals’ 
Fourth Amendment protection in the hands of law enforcement, a change that would prevent the 
verification of reasonable searches and seizures. The Court emphasized the importance of the 
“safeguards” for protecting individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.8 
 Although much of the language in this case relates to the reasonableness of searches and 
seizures using electronic surveillance, its holding remains relevant to discussion of privacy in the 
United States. By recognizing the intent of the petitioner to keep information private, the Court 
acknowledged the importance of personal privacy as a threshold for Fourth Amendment 
protection. In other words, the Court could apply Fourth Amendment protections in cases where 
an individual demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy. This concept was further defined 
by Justice Harlan’s concurrence, in which he argued that this expectation contains both 
subjective and objective components; where a person has an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy that society would reasonably (objectively) view as reasonable, Fourth Amendment 
protections exist.9 The Court not only recognized privacy as a component of the Fourth 
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Amendment but also provided it equal protections from electronic surveillance as for physical 
trespass. 
 The protection of privacy from government interference provided by the Katz Court also 
reflects several aspects of political culture as highlighted in Chapter 3. First, the primary focus of 
the discussion surrounding the reasonableness of searches and seizures was on the role of a 
neutral magistrate in preventing the overstep of law enforcement. Therefore the Court did not 
recognize the importance of privacy from all intrusion, but only overly invasive and thus 
unreasonable government intrusion. This framing returns to the concept of the careful balance of 
powers within the Constitution to protect citizens from undue government interference and 
oppression. Justice Douglas further expanded upon this idea in his concurrence, arguing that 
“under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not 
supposed to be neutral and disinterested.”10 This is, he noted, especially true for matter regarding 
national security. He therefore disagreed with providing the Executive branch with the power to 
“resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant … in ‘national security’ matters.”11 
Although not binding authority, Justice Douglas detailed a concern about the Executive Branch 
circumventing the warrant requirement for national security, and infringing upon the rights of 
citizens in the process. 
Second, the majority opinion also carefully discussed how privacy is detailed within the 
Fourth Amendment, as it provides recognition to the states’ authority in certain regards. The 
Court stated, “the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to 
privacy.’ That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental 
intrusion… Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of 
government invasion. But the protection of a person’s general right to privacy – his right to be 
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let alone by other people – is, like the protection of his property and his very life, left largely to 
the law of the individual States.”12 From a federal level, the Court is only concerned about 
violations of privacy through government intrusion; other aspects of personal privacy remain 
with the power of the state. This continued focus on the rights of the states reflects the continued 
republican traditions created by the framing of the Constitution, where the federal government 
protects citizens from unreasonable government intrusion while leaving significant deference to 
the states. 
 
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) 
 The Court also addressed the privacy implications of wiretapping as conducted by private 
citizens, rather than by the government. In Bartnicki v. Vopper information from a telephone call 
was recorded and released to the press, requiring the Court to look at the intersection between 
First Amendment free speech rights and an individual’s right to privacy concerning their 
conversations. More specifically, this case involved contentious collective-bargaining 
negotiations between a teachers’ union and school board in Pennsylvania, during which a 
conversation involving Bartnicki, the union’s primary negotiator, was intercepted, recorded, and 
released to several radio stations.13 The interception of the call was held to violate § 2511(1)(c) 
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, entitled “Wiretapping 
and Electronic,” a law designed to “protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral 
communications.”14 The specific section violated applies to any person who, “willfully discloses 
or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication, 
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of 
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a wire or communication.”15 This law was expanded to include radio transmissions through the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.16  
However, in the case of Bartnicki, the individual responsible for the recording of the 
conversation in question was never discovered; instead, the suit was filed against those, 
including Vopper, who had played the conversation on the radio. The case before the Court 
therefore related to “the repeated intentional disclosure of an illegally intercepted cellular 
telephone conversation about a public issue.” Because the conversation played related to a public 
negotiation, it was considered to be a public issue. Despite being a more public issue, there 
remain privacy considerations for Bartnicki because of the manner in which the conversation 
took place, that being via cellular phone.17 However, the press also has an interest in its ability to 
“[publish] matters of public importance.”18 The case before the Court therefore presented “a 
conflict between interests of the highest order – on the one hand, the interest in the full and free 
dissemination of information concerning public issues, and on the other hand, the interest in 
individual privacy and, more specifically, fostering private speech.”19 
Although the Court recognized the importance of privacy in telephone conversations, 
they ultimately held that the First Amendment protections for the press outweighed privacy 
concerns, thus ruling in favor of Vopper. This holding was based on the acceptance of three key 
aspects of the respondents’ argument. First, the respondents were not actually involved with the 
illegal interception of the conversation. Second, although the conversation itself was recorded 
illegally, the respondents’ obtainment of it from the individual who recorded it was legal. Third, 
the subject of the conversation was “a matter of public concern.”20 In other words, although the 
information was collected illegally, the respondents should not be held liable. Furthermore, the 
press has the freedom to publish matters of public concern. The Court noted that this First 
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Amendment protection creates an issue for the application of the statute in this case, as “state 
action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional 
concerns.”21  
The Court weighed this First Amendment protection against the privacy considerations 
held by the petitioner. They recognized that “privacy of communication is an important interest,” 
and is an interest recognized by both judicial precedent and by legislation. Title III of the statute 
applied to the case, for example, was created to protect this privacy interest and thus, 
“[encourage] the uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among private parties.”22 Failing 
to properly protect this interest, and give individuals reason to believe that their private 
conversations could be made public “might well have a chilling effect on private speech.”23 
However, the Court also recognized that not all intrusions on privacy are equally offensive and, 
because the petitioner was involved in activities of public concern, the related speech had 
diminished privacy protections, as “one of the costs associated with participation in public affairs 
is an attendant loss of privacy.”24 The Court therefore concluded that “in this case, privacy 
concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance.”25 
Although this case does not relate to the Fourth Amendment implications of privacy, it 
still has important ramifications for a judicial and legislative understanding of privacy. First, the 
Court’s protection of individuals’ private conversations is not by any means absolute. It may be 
outweighed by the more explicit protections in the Bill of Rights, such as the First Amendment 
protection of the freedom of the press. Second, the privacy protections afforded to conversations 
are not equal for every individual or every situation. Although they are still protected from the 
monitoring and recording prohibited by Title III, conversations concerning points of general 
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public interest are not universally protected from the press simply because they may have 
originally occurred in a private realm. When these more public matters are concerned, the 
priority is an individual’s ability to share truthful information with the public, rather than an 
individual’s ability to protect their views from all external actors. 
However, this second point was contested by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent, an 
opinion with which Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas also joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
approached the question between the freedom of the press and the right to privacy as both 
originating from the First Amendment protections on speech. He argued that the majority 
opinion, “diminishes, rather than enhances, the purposes of the First Amendment: chilling the 
speech of the millions of Americans who rely upon electronic technology to communicate.”26 
Privacy concerns, he argued, are inseparably related to the “desire that personal conversations be 
frank and uninhibited,” a desire that would be jeopardized by widespread surveillance and 
publicizing of private affairs, even those of potential public interest.  By attempting to protect 
one aspect of First Amendment protections, the majority created concerning implications for the 
First Amendment freedom of speech, as individuals’ concerns that their conversations be made 
public could have a “chilling” effect on their speech. Although this was a concern considered by 
the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent that this chilling effect was properly 
avoided through Title III; the statute should therefore have weight over the press interests of the 
respondents.27  
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is by its nature contrary to the precedent 
created by this decision, and therefore not binding authority, it shows the variety of views held 
by the justices in relation to privacy issues. The majority let freedom of the press outweigh 
privacy interests, but there remain concerns about how failing to protect privacy surrounding 
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speech may affect the nature of individuals’ communications. It is also worth drawing attention 
to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s use of the First Amendment to recognize individuals’ right to 
privacy in relation to their speech. Whereas, the Court in Katz used the Fourth Amendment to 
protect individual’s speech, where it maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy, from 
government intrusion, the First Amendment may also provide implicit protection of an 
individual’s private speech from being brought into the public realm by other individuals.  
 
United States v. Jones (2012) 
 The Court in United States v. Jones applied some of the legal reasoning evolving from 
Katz to a more current technological issue. In Jones, police officers used a Global-Positioning-
System (GPS) tracking device to monitor an individual’s movements in his vehicle, after 
suspecting his involvement in trafficking narcotics. Although the police used a variety of 
surveillance techniques, the GPS tracking was the only method under contention because the 
warrant justifying it was void at the time of installation. The district court in the District of 
Columbia had given the government a warrant authorizing the use of a tracking device on the 
respondent’s vehicle, to be installed in D.C. borders and within ten days; however, officers 
installed the tracking device eleven days later and in Maryland. Because the warrant no longer 
applied, a search or seizure could not, under the Fourth Amendment, be constitutional; the 
question before the Court was therefore “whether the attachment of a… GPS tracking device to 
an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on 
public streets constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”28 
 To determine if a search or seizure occurred, the Court turned to two previous test used in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First is the traditional trespass doctrine from English common 
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law, where a physical intrusion or occupation of an individual’s protected property constitutes a 
search. This understanding of Fourth Amendment protections reflected the cultural importance of 
property rights as a part of the Constitution.29 However, as technology advanced this limited 
view of searches and seizures was expanded upon by Justice Harlan’s test in his concurrence in 
Katz. As mentioned earlier, this test finds that “a violation occurs when government officers 
violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”30 Although the Katz test is more 
inclusive of Fourth Amendment violations that involve technology, the Court in Jones was 
careful to note that this new test is not a substitute from the common-law trespass doctrine. In 
other words, a lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy does not preclude a Fourth 
Amendment violation from occurring if a physical intrusion on protected property occurs: “the 
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common 
law trespassory test.”31 In determining whether a Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurs, 
the Court thus looks first to whether a physical trespass has occurred; if there has been no 
physical intrusion then a determination of a reasonable expectation of privacy may subsequently 
establish that a search has occurred.  
 For the case at bar in Jones, the Court held that the common-law trespass doctrine 
provided sufficient means to establish that a search occurred, as the installation of the GPS 
tracking device on the respondent’s vehicle “encroached on a protected area.”32 Because of the 
physical trespass that occurred, the Court did not need to apply the Katz test to determine 
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his long-term movements while 
in his vehicle. By focusing solely on the physical trespass side of the Jones investigation, the 
Court failed to address the constitutionality of GPS tracking itself, and therefore whether GPS 
tracking without an unconstitutional trespass would be constitutional. 
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 Although the majority opinion failed to rule on this question regarding GPS tracking 
itself, Justice Sotomayor addressed the concern in her concurrence. Her concurrence agreed with 
the majority’s holding that the government violated the respondent’s Fourth Amendment 
protections by, “intruding on a constitutionally protected area.” However, she argued that ending 
the analysis there fails to recognize the other Fourth Amendment violation that occurred through 
the long-term surveillance; it is also necessary to analyze how expectations of privacy were 
implicated. Although this secondary analysis was not necessary to find the government’s actions 
in Jones unconstitutional, Justice Sotomayor recognized “physical intrusion is now unnecessary 
to many forms of surveillance.”33 These forms of surveillance will therefore soon require the sole 
application of the Katz test, a test that she then applies in her concurrence. Justice Sotomayor, as 
well as Justice Alito in his concurrence, argued that “longer GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”34 
 To understand why this violation occurs, Justice Sotomayor drew a comparison between 
GPS tracking and traditional police surveillance. Even though similar information can be 
obtained through police surveillance, which does not require a warrant, as through GPS 
monitoring, because both involve movements on public roads, the implications of GPS 
technology for privacy are considerable. She noted, “GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflect a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious and sexual associations.”35 Although the nature of the 
information may be similar to police surveillance, the quantity of information collected may 
reveal very private aspects of an individuals regular actions. Furthermore, “because GPS 
monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, 
proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement 
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practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”36 The inexpensive and efficient 
nature of GPS technology may make it an attractive option for law enforcement with limited 
resources. However, Justice Sotomayor raised concerns about how the limitless use of this 
technology may lead to unchecked police invasion into individuals’ private lives. This practice 
would “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to 
society,” as “awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive 
freedoms.”37 The implications of widespread, unchecked GPS tracking, are therefore 
considerable enough that they could alter the manner in which individuals act. 
 Although Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence does not provide binding authority, it does 
provide an interpretation of the privacy concerns regarding GPS tracking technology that are 
lacking from the majority opinion. Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that while the question at 
hand may have been easily resolved through the common-law trespass doctrine, the case had far 
greater implications for personal privacy and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The 
government’s ability to use technology to monitor an individual’s every movement goes beyond 
traditional surveillance methods to chip away at the liberties provided by the Bill of Rights. As 
noted in Katz, an individual’s Fourth Amendment protections do not disappear when he enters 
the public realm, but only where he no longer demonstrates a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.38 Although an individual may not have an expectation of privacy in short-term 
movements on public roads, Justice Sotomayor acknowledges that this expectation of privacy 
does exist when considering the aggregation of one’s movements long-term.  
 In terms of political culture, the majority opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
highlight the influence of several aspects of American political culture as discussed in Chapter 
Four. First, the emphasis on the common-law trespass test to determine when searches and 
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seizures occur shows the continued influence of English common law, as well as the importance 
of property rights. Be emphasizing the supplementary nature of the Katz test to the trespass 
doctrine, the Court ensured the protection of private property from physical intrusion, regardless 
of whether there is an expectation of privacy. Thus, although reasonable expectations of privacy 
are recognized as providing Fourth Amendment protections, the emphasis is still on the 
protection of private property. This represents the original language of the Fourth Amendment, 
as protecting individuals’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and not their privacy. Second, 
Justice Sotomayor’s concerns about the future implications of GPS tracking reflect a desire to 
ensure that Fourth Amendment protections are not diminished by new technology. The 
government’s ability to more efficiently conduct surveillance should not excuse invasions into a 
person’s private life. 
 
Riley v. California (2014) 
 In June 2014 the Court issued a joint ruling on two separate cases: Riley v. California and 
United States v. Wurie, both of which dealt with a police search of an arrested individual’s cell 
phone without acquiring a warrant. In the case of Riley, the petitioner was pulled over for driving 
with expired registration tags; his car was impounded and during the routine investigation of the 
impounded vehicle law enforcement discovered two handguns. The petitioner was arrested for 
possession of a concealed and loaded firearm. During the search of his car, law enforcement 
found items associated with a gang, and “went through” the petitioner’s smart phone to look for 
incriminating photos of illegal gang activity; they found photos that led to the petitioner being 
convicted for attempted murder, among other charges.39 In the case of Wurie, law enforcement 
witnessed the respondent make an apparent drug deal, subsequently arresting him. While at the 
  79 
 
police station, the police seized two cell phones on his person, searching one, a flip phone, for 
recent calls. Law enforcement was able to use his call log to locate his home phone number and 
home address. After acquiring a search warrant, they searched his home, finding illegal drugs, a 
firearm and cash; the respondent was convicted of distributing crack cocaine, and two other 
related charges. In both cases the defendant sought to suppress all evidence yielded through the 
warrantless search of their cell phone.40 Although the cases were argued separately, one opinion 
was issued for both due to the similarity of the facts. 
 The question before the Court was therefore whether police may conduct a search of the 
content of an arrestee’s cell phone, as they would with any other effect found on his person at the 
time of arrest, without first obtaining a warrant. The Court held that this is an unreasonable 
search, and thus an unconstitutional infringement of the Fourth Amendment. Although the Court 
has long recognized the right of the government to “search the person of the accused when 
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime,”41 they also recognized 
that the scope of this government power has been contested for equally as long.42 To determine 
the constitutional scope of this power in relation to cell phones the Court turned to three 
landmark cases regarding this issue.  
First, in Chimel v. California (1969), law enforcement searched the entire home of an 
arrestee on the grounds that this search lied within a recognized warrant exception where officers 
may protect their own safety by “remov[ing] any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in 
order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”43 However, the Court held that this exception did not 
apply to Chimel, because the search went beyond what was necessary to ensure the security of 
the arrest and the safety of the officers. Second, the Court narrowed this holding in United States 
v. Robinson (1973), in which an officer inspected a pack of cigarettes found on an arrestee’s 
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person, discovering capsules of heroin. The Court held this to be a reasonable search “even 
though there was no concern about the loss of evidence, and the arresting officer had no specific 
concern that Robinson might be armed.”44 Because the cigarette package was personal property 
“immediately associated with the person of the arrestee,” law enforcement was entitled to inspect 
it.45 Finally, the Court in Arizona v. Gant (2009), applied these principles to vehicles, adding that 
law enforcement may also search a vehicle “when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”46 
To apply these principles to the case of cell phones, the Riley Court turned to the 
balancing test reflected within these previous decisions. Through this balancing test, the Court 
determines when a warrant is necessary for a search at the time of arrest, “by assessing, on the 
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy, and on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”47 Unlike in 
Robinson, where the concerns about the destruction of evidence and the safety of officers 
outweighed the privacy considerations of the individuals, “there is no comparable risk when the 
search is of digital data.”48 Although the government in both cases argued that there may be risks 
of losing data through encryption or remote wiping, many law enforcement agencies have begun 
using “Faraday bags” which isolate the phone from radio waves and thus protect the 
government’s interests until a warrant can be acquired without infringing upon the privacy 
concerns of the individual.49 
The Court then turned its attentions to the other half of the balancing test; what are the 
privacy considerations at hand with cell phone technology. Cell phones are able to provide a 
greater variety and a greater quantity of information at one’s fingertips than previous technology. 
In this sense, “cell phones differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense from other objects 
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that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”50 A person would be unlikely to carry with them 
every piece of mail they receive, a complete log of all phone call, a full photo album, a rolodex 
of contact numbers, or quantities of private information, yet through a cell phone this 
information can be now found on their person.51 This quantity and variety of information 
available is even greater when cloud computing is taken into consideration, as information stored 
remotely can also be accessed through an individual’s cell phone.52 Even if police were to search 
a phone only for specific information, they could still discover different information as an 
unintended effect of their search. By allowing law enforcement to search an individual’s cell 
phone, they would be able to gain a significantly larger quantity and variety of information than 
would reasonable ever be available on an arrestee’s person in the pre-digital era – a “significant 
diminution of privacy.”53 The Court ultimately recognized that “modern cell phones are not just 
another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for 
many Americans ‘the privacies of life.”54 The protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment 
still apply to this information, even though individuals may now carry this information on their 
person. The search of a cell phone without a warrant therefore fails the balancing test and is an 
unconstitutional infringement of an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment protections. 
The decision in Riley also contained several implications for American political culture, 
both in terms of state powers and the separation of federal powers. Similarly to Katz v. United 
States, the question at bar related to the overstepping of the government during an investigation, 
and not the invasion of privacy by other members of society. However, where Katz specifically 
noted the role of the state in determining and protecting general rights to privacy, it is worth 
noting that the respondent in Riley was the State of California, as the Supreme Court of 
California denied the petition for review, while the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
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Although this is hardly a unique occurrence, it reflects the Court’s willingness to intervene with 
state issues related to the infringement of a liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.  
The importance of the separation of powers, another element of political culture 
discussed in Chapter Four, also appears in Justice Alito’s concurrence. In discussing his concerns 
regarding the scope of the majority opinion, he notes the advantage of passing legislation to 
clarify the issue, as Congress had done to clarify the use of electronic surveillance after the 
decision in Katz. Justice Alito states that “because of the role that these devices have come to 
play in contemporary life, searching their contents implicates very sensitive privacy interests that 
this Court is poorly positioned to understand and evaluate.” By contrast, “legislatures, elected by 
the people, are in a better position…to assess and respond to the changes that have already 
occurred and those that will almost certainly take place in the future.”55 Whereas the Court often 
addresses the need to prevent government oppression, it is interesting how the separation of 




 Through these four decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that a qualified right to 
privacy exists and is provided a certain degree of protection. As the Court held in Katz, the 
Fourth Amendment may provide this protection when a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
infringed by a governmental investigation. The specific test created by Justice Harlan in his 
concurrence for this case, has been applied by the Court to determine when a reasonable 
expectation of privacy occurs. Although the Jones Court did not need to apply the Katz test, as a 
physical trespass had occurred which automatically classified the investigation as a search, 
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Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence stressed the need to address how privacy is implicated by 
advanced electronic surveillance. The Court addressed this question three years later in Riley, 
where they recognized the unique nature of cell phones, in comparison to other effects an 
individual may carry on their person, and held that law enforcement must acquire a warrant prior 
to searching an arrestee’s cell phone. However, privacy is not solely protected from government 
intrusion. The Bartnicki Court recognized the privacy of individual conversations which may be 
protected from intrusion and publication by other individuals. Although the Court ultimately held 
that other liberties protected by the Bill of Rights may outweigh privacy interests in certain 
cases, it upheld the general ruling that private communications warrant a certain degree of 
protection.   
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Chapitre Six: Jurisprudence française sur la vie privée 
Introduction  
 Dans Chapitre Quatre j’ai examiné les aspects de la culture politique en France qui 
viennent de: la Déclarations des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, et de la Constitution de la Ve 
République. Dans Chapitre Six , je prends cette connaissance de la culture politique et je 
l’applique à une analyse des décisions de la Cour de Cassation concernant la vie privée. 
J’analyse quatre cas, et chacun concerne un aspect différent de la vie privée lié aux avances 
technologiques. Puisque la Cour nomme ses cas avec les chiffres et pas avec des noms des 
parties représentées, (comme le fait la Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis), je les identifie seulement 
par les chiffres. J’étudie le cas 86-90297 (1987), qui concerne l’écoutes téléphoniques, le cas 10-
11777 (2011), qui concerne la fouille gouvernementale des portables technologiques, et les cas 
11-84308 (2011) et 12-82391 (2014) qui concernent l’utilisation du GPS pour le pistage. Pendant 
la lecture des ces cas j’utilise une série des questions (Figure 1) pour assurer une analyse 
standardisée de chaque cas. 
Avant de commencer cet analyse, je veux brièvement discuter comment les cas 
judiciaires en France sont différents des cas judiciaires aux Etats-Unis. D’abord, le système 
judiciaire français a une influence plus romaine, comparé au système américain qui est influencé 
plus par le système anglais. C’est à dire que le système français utilise plus la codification dans 
les décisions tandis que le système américain compte sur le précédent créé par la jurisprudence. 
Le résultat est que  les décisions françaises sont souvent plus courts et directement affiché que 
ceux des Etats-Unis. À la place d’une analyse longue des principes légales, La Cour française 
applique et interprète simplement le code français aux situations contestées.1 Bien que nous 
voyions l’évolution des conceptions légaux moins dans ces décisions, on peut encore voir 
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comment la Cour de Cassation interprète le droit individuel à la vie privée vis-à-vis des 
nouveaux modes de surveillance, comme les écoutes téléphoniques et la géolocalisation. 
L’application du code, et les articles du code eux-mêmes, peuvent aussi nous offrir un moyen de 










86-90297 (1987) : Écoutes téléphoniques 
 Dans cet appel du 11 février 1987, la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de Cassation 
considère le pourvoi contre un arrêt de la Cour d’appel d’Aix-en-Provence. Ce cas porte sur 
l’arrêt d’un homme qui a porté « l’atteinte à l’intimité de la vie privée et utilisation 
d’installations de télécommunications sans autorisations. »2 Le prévenu a été trouvé coupable par 
les juges de fond d’avoir écouté et enregistré les conversations de son épouse. Le prévenu a 
commencé ces écoutes en 1982, après que sa femme a constaté l’installation d’un téléphone dans 
l’appartement, sans savoir que son épouse y avait mis aussi des appareils enregistreurs. Il a 
justifié cet enregistrement en disant qu’il avait « les doutes sur la fidélité de son épouse. »3 En 
1983, le couple a reçu, pendant une procédure de divorce, une ordonnance de non conciliation, et 
 
13. Quelle est la question constitutionnelle revue par la Cour ? 
14. Quel est le résultat du cas ? Est-ce que la Cour a prononcé un jugement 
favorable ou opposé à la vie privée? 
15. Auxquels tests ou principes légaux la Cour a-t-elle recours ?  
16. La Cour cite-t-elle les cas précédents signifiants ; si oui, augmente ou a 
diminue les protections de la vie privée ? 
17. Quels éléments de la culture politique sont évidents dans la décision ? 
18. La Cour cite-t-elle des lois internationales ou des décisions des cours 
internationales ? 
Figure 1: Questions pour les cas judiciaires français 
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la femme a démarré son propre entreprise. Le prévenu a continué d’enregistrer les conversations 
de sa femme chez elle et à son bureau. Il constate d’avoir « fait placer le matériel pour écouter 
les communications de son épouse ». 
 Par conséquent, la question devant la Cour est si cet enregistrement téléphonique est une 
atteinte criminelle de la vie privée. Pour déterminer la constitutionalité de l’arrêt et la 
condamnation, la Cour se tourne à la logique employée par la cour d’appel. D’abord, la Cour 
d’appel reconnaît que les appareils étaient dans le logement du prévenu et « qu’il ne peut y avoir 
atteinte à la vie privée d’installer un système d’écoute sur les lignes téléphoniques situées dans 
son propre domicile tout autant que celui de sa femme. »4 Mais, il a continué de le faire après le 
divorce et dans l’appartement de son anicienne épouse ainsi que dans son bureau. De plus, la 
Cour souligne l’importance du caractère des conversations ; l’atteinte de la vie privée « n’est 
constitué[e] que si les conversations surprises ont un caractère privé. »5 Bien que les juges de 
fond n’aient pas fait une analyse des ces conversations, la nature des enregistrements constatés 
par le prévenu délinéent un caractère privé. Enfin, l’aveu du prévenu qu’il a écouté et enregistré 
les conversations de son épousé pendant et après leur mariage, et dans leur résidence aussi que 
dans son bureau, montre une atteinte de la vie privée. Malgré les violations mineures de la Cour 
d’appel, comme l’échec de rechercher le caractère exacte des conversations enregistrées, la Cour 
de Cassation reconnaît que la décision est valide, disant que, « exemptes d’insuffisance et de 
contradiction, la Cour d’appels a caractérisé en tous ses éléments constitutifs, le délit d’atteinte à 
l’intimité de la vie privée. »6 Donc, la Cour rejette le pourvoi. 
 Bien que la Cour ait rejeté le pourvoi, cet appel néanmoins reflète les aspects de la 
culture politique en France. D’abord ce cas concerne l’atteinte à la vie privée d’un individu par 
un individu, et pas par l’État. Donc il reflète que les citoyens ont de la protection universelle de 
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ces types de violations, et pas simplement la protection de l’atteinte gouvernementale. Ce point 
de vue montre un de piliers de la Déclaration des droit de l’homme et du citoyen ; ce document a 
créé plus des libertés individuelles qui sont protégées de l’oppression de l’État, il a créé aussi une 
société cohésive et réglée. De plus, ce rejet ne discute pas les différences entre les écoutes 
téléphoniques et les atteintes de la vie privée plus traditionnelles, comme la violation de la 
propriété. La simplicité de la décision montre aussi l’empressement de la Cour de reconnaître la 
surveillance électronique comme une atteinte de la vie privée similaire aux ceux de l’époque pré-
numérique. Enfin, bien que cette décision soit un rejet d’un appel, elle montre les connaissances 
simples et culturelles sur l’utilisation de la surveillance électronique qui viole la vie privée. 
  
10-11777 (2011) : Saisie d’informations électroniques 
 Cet appel du 18 janvier 2011 vient d’une cour d’appel à Paris pour que la Chambre 
commerciale de la Cour de Cassation puisse le considérer. Ce cas concerne une investigation 
autorisée par le tribunal de grande instance à Paris pour rechercher la fraude fiscale. La cour a 
donné le pouvoir aux agents de l’administration des impôts à faire des opérations de visite et de 
saisie des endroits probablement utilisés par les chefs de l’entreprise en question. Selon l’ordre 
judicaire, ils ont saisi un ordinateur portable et un disque dur externe qui avaient été scellés par 
les propriétaires. Ensuite, les investigateurs ont copié certains fichiers de l’ordinateur et toutes 
les informations du disque qui ont été restituées par le prévenu. L’entreprise en question a fait 
recours contre le déroulement de ces opérations.7 La décision de la Cour à propos de la légalité 
de l’investigation est une réponse à chaque action prise par les avocats de l’entreprise.  
 En général, les avocats pour l’entreprise proposent des moyens au sujet des détails plus 
petits de l’investigation et pas l’investigation elle-même. Par exemple, ils affirment que « la 
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signature du procès-verbaux des opérations de visite et de saisie et d’inventaire de saisie sans 
réserve ne constitue pas une renonciation à exercer les voies de recours ouvertes à la loi à tous 
les intéressés. »8 Autrement dit, quand les prévenus ont signé le procès-verbaux, ils n’ont pas 
abandonné leurs droits comme citoyens de faire des appels à propos de la manière dans laquelle 
les informations ont été ramassées. De plus, cette signature ça ne donne pas de liberté illimitée à 
l’investigation de saisir, de copier, et d’utiliser tout ce qu’ils ont trouvé. Le gouvernement a 
toujours l’obligation de faire une inventaire complète des documents saisis, une exigence que 
l’entreprise soutient n’était pas faite correctement.9 Enfin, les avocats pour l’entreprise affirment 
que la saisie de la correspondance entre les avocats et l’entreprise était une saisie illégale.10 
Cependant, la Cour décide que ces moyens ont été fondés sur les contresens des processus faits 
pendant l’investigation et les pouvoirs donnés à l’enquête par la cour de grande instance à Paris ; 
la Cour rejette le pourvoi.11 
 Puisque ce cas concerne la légalité d’une saisie d’informations électroniques d’une 
entreprise, sa signifiance pour la vie privée n’est pas immédiatement évidente. Cependant, le 
concept de la vie privée est mentionné dans un des moyens annexe de l’opinion. Les avocats 
pour l’entreprise font référence à l’article 8 de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme 
qui constate que, « toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale, de son domicile 
et de sa correspondance. »12 La saisie des correspondances entre les prévenus et leurs avocats 
transgresse, selon cet argument, ce droit internationalement reconnu. Quoique la Cour ne 
mentionne pas cette protection spécifiquement, l’inclusion de cet argument par les avocats 
montre que le droit international est une considération de la communauté légale. Cette mention 
fait référence aussi aux conséquences sur la vie privée de l’investigation, et a l’argument que 
l’étendue de la saisie des informations constitue une atteinte du droit. Puis, les arguments revus 
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par la Cour reflètent des soucis implicites liés à la vie privée. Les arguments concernant 
l’étendue des saisies et l’investigation en général reflètent l’idée que la vie privée puisse être 
violée même en cas de mandat judicaire.  
En outre, la culture politique est reflétée dans les références à la séparation des pouvoirs. 
Les avocats des prévenus disent que « l’administration est en droit d’appréhender tous les 
documents » qui sont « visés par l’ordonnance judiciaire autorisant les opérations de visite et 
saisie. »13 Alors, ils reconnaissent la capacité de l’administration de faire des saisies 
d’informations privées à cause de l’autorisation judiciaire qui détermine la légalité des saisies. Il 
y a une équilibre entre les communications privées d’un acteur, dans ce cas une entreprise, et 
l’intérêt gouvernemental d’appliquer les lois. Les enquêtes seront légales pourvu qu’ils suivent 
les lois démocratiquement créées, c’est à dire, le Code français. Dans ce sens, ce cas reflète des 
aspects Du Contrat Social de Rousseau dans lequel il reconnaît la nécessité de protéger les droits 
individuels du despotisme mais en même temps de créer une société cohésive et bien 
fonctionnante des individus qui est basée sur le compromis.  
 
11-84308 (2011) : Écoutes téléphoniques et géolocalisation 
 Ce pourvoi du 22 novembre 2011 devant la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de Cassation, 
concerne une investigation des prévenus soupçonnés des crimes liées aux stupéfiants et le 
blanchiment d’argent. Les quatre prévenus ont fait des appels séparés en réponse aux formes de 
surveillance utilisées pendant l’investigation : les écoutes téléphoniques, la géolocalisation des 
véhicules, et la sonorisation et la captation d’images d’un parking souterrain.14 À cause des 
similarités des pourvois, la Cour les analyse ensemble. Dans leur décision, la Cour répond aux 
cinq arguments des avocats pour les prévenus à propos des atteintes légales spécifiques. En 
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général, les avocats soutiennent que l’investigation a enfreint les articles de quatre systèmes 
légaux différents : article 16 de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, articles 16 et 
66 de la Constitution, article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, et plusieurs 
sections du code de procédure pénale.15 
 Premièrement, les avocats pour les prévenus affirment que la saisie de la localisation et la 
liste des appels des trois lignes téléphoniques en question n’était pas suffisamment autorisée. Les 
officiers de la police ont reçu l’autorisation du procureur de la République mais cela n’est pas, 
selon les avocats, l’autorisation nécessaire ; c’est à dire, l’autorisation d’un juge. La manque 
d’autorisation d’une partie neutre la rend nulle.16 La Cour n’est pas d’accord avec cet argument. 
Selon elle, il y avait suffisamment de soupçon pour justifier cette mesure, conformément au code 
du procédure pénale, sans violer le droit de liberté protégé par l’article 5 de la Convention 
européenne des droits de l’homme.17 La Cour ainsi rejette ce premier argument. Les avocats font 
un argument similaire à propos de l’autorisation déplacée de la géolocalisation ; cet argument est 
également rejeté par la Cour pour des raisons similaires.18  
 Les autres trois moyens faits par les avocats concernent des débats plus techniques. Par 
exemple, le deuxième moyen affirme que les enquêteurs n’ont pas fini les écoutes téléphoniques 
avant la date donnée par l’autorisation, un fait incorrect rejeté par la Cour.19 Le cinquième 
argument soutient aussi que les informations saisies pendant l’investigation étaient en dehors de 
celles dictées par le juge d’instruction.20 Cependant, la Cour trouve que le juge avait permis 
l’investigation de certains faits, ce qui à mené à d’autres informations suspicieuses, alors 
l’enquête sur toutes les informations est permissible. Le dernier moyen technique utilisé par les 
avocats est un peu plus pertinent à la vie privée parce qu’il concerne la nature d’un parking 
souterrain où les enquêteurs ont fait les opérations de sonorisation et a pris des images. Les 
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avocats soutiennent que le parking, qui est sous d’un immeuble, constitue un « lieu 
d’habitation » et pas un « lieu privé » ; donc, il faut avoir des autorisations spéciales pour y faire 
des investigations.21 La Cour trouve que la mise en place des dispositifs techniques était faite 




12-82391 (2014) : La géolocalisation 
 Dans cet appel du 15 octobre 2014, la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de Cassation 
considère un cas où les autorités ont utilisé la géolocalisation sur un véhicule comme un de leurs 
modes d’investigation des suspects. À la fin de l’investigation, les suspects ont été reconnus 
coupables de plusieurs crimes liées aux activités criminelles associées avec les bandes 
organisées, telles que le vol avec arme, l’assassinat, les tentatives d’assassinat, et les infractions à 
la législation sur les armes. Les convictions viennent de deux arrêts différents, alors les avocats 
pour la défense font deux arguments pendant l’appel.22 Le premier concerne principalement 
l’utilisation de la géolocalisation tandis que le deuxième répond aux classifications des 
convictions données comparées aux crimes faites. Dans les deux arguments, le conseiller fait 
appel à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et du code de procédure pénale en 
France.23 
 Le premier argument soutient que l’usage de la géolocalisation, mise sur le véhicule d’un 
des suspects, constitue une atteinte à la vie privée. La Cour répond à l’argument en constatant 
que l’usage de la géolocalisation n’est jamais explicitement adressée dans le droit français. Par 
conséquent, ils se tournent aux autres parties du code de procédure pénale en vigueur, plus 
spécifiquement les articles 12, 14, et 41, qui, «confient à la police judiciaire le soin de ‘constater 
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les infractions à la loi pénale, d’en rassembler les preuves et d’en rechercher les autres’ sous le 
contrôle du procureur de la République ».24 La police a suivi les procédures pour les autres 
modes d’investigation ; la question est alors si la géolocalisation nécessite plus de contrôle à 
cause de sa nature plus envahissante. La Cour décide que ces nouvelles procédures ne sont pas 
nécessaires parce que la géolocalisation ne conduit qu’aux mêmes données informatiques que 
surveillance visuelle, la forme plus traditionnelle de surveillance. En outre, la Cour revoit la 
condition du véhicule, qui avait une ouverture suspecte dans la carrosserie, et donc, a donné aux 
officiers la cause de l’investiguer plus profondément. 25  
 Ensuite, les avocats pour les prévenus font référence à la Convention européenne des 
droits de l’homme. Ils soutiennent que la police a violé l’article 6, §1, de la Convention, qui 
constate que, « Toute personne a droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue équitablement, 
publiquement et dans un délai raisonnable, par un tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi par la 
loi, qui décidera, soit des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractère civil, soit du 
bien-fondé de toute accusation en matière pénale dirigée contre elle. »26 Les avocats affirment 
que l’usage de la géolocalisation a eu lieu sans considération appropriée par des parties neutres. 
Elle a donc influencé injustement le reste des procédures judiciaires. Cet atteinte aussi représente 
un abus de pouvoir que l’article 6 de la Convention interdit.27 L’argument mentionne aussi 
l’article 8 de la Convention, déjà cité dans la discussion du cas 10-11777. Cet article donne plus 
de protections aux individus contre l’intrusion injustifiée du gouvernement ; cependant, la Cour 
décide que ce mode de surveillance n’est pas plus envahissant que d’autres. Le droit européen et 
français ne créent pas de « liste limitative de moyens d’investigations, » alors les juridictions 
peuvent les interpréter par rapport aux techniques nouvelles.28 Enfin, les avocats citent une 
décision de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme de 1984, qui applique l’article 8, en 
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disant, « dans le contexte de mesures de surveillance secrète la loi doit user de termes assez clairs 
pour indiquer à tous de manière suffisante en quelles circonstances et sous quelles conditions elle 
habilité la puissance publique à recourir à de telle mesures. »29 Cependant, la Cour affirme que 
les articles 12, 14, et 41 du code de procédure pénale donne cette direction claire nécessitée par 
la Cour européenne. Par conséquent, ce premier argument n’est pas admis par la Cour. 
 De plus, les avocats promeuvent un deuxième moyen, celui désigné à adresser la 
classification des convictions des prévenus. Alors, ce moyen se concentre principalement sur les 
désaccord entre les histoires des prévenus et des investigateurs, et sur les lois concernant les 
classifications des crimes. Par conséquent, ce deuxième moyen n’est pas pertinent aux 
considérations de la vie privée ou même à la surveillance ; en bref, la Cour n’a pas admis le 
moyen et le pourvoi en général a été rejeté. Les détails importants de ce cas viennent du premier 
moyen et les interprétations faites par la Cour. La Cour considère comment les protections 
individuelles données par le droit français et le droit européen s’appliquent aux nouvelles 
manières de surveillance, et décident que la géolocalisation est légale dans ce cas parce qu’elle 
est similairement que les autres modes de surveillance. Donc, l’usage de la géolocalisation sur 
une véhicule dans le contexte de cette investigation ne nécessite pas d’interprétation nouvelle des 
lois existantes. Dans un contexte culturel, cette décision reflète comment le droit individuel à la 
vie privée est nuancé, surtout en termes d’une investigation qui concerne le bien-être de la 
société en général. Si les autorités suivent les règles mis en place pour la protection des individus 
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Conclusion 
 Ces cas judiciaires montrent comment la Cour de Cassation en France a interprété le droit 
pertinent en France pour déterminer la légalité des surveillances faites par le gouvernement et par 
les individus avec l’usage de la nouvelle technologie. Principalement la Cour fait référence au 
code pénal français pour ces interprétations mais avec les trois cas les plus récents, nous voyons 
que le droit international, plus spécifiquement la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 
devient une considération importante. En outre, ces décisions montrent que la reconnaissance de 
la vie privée existe déjà dans les lois nationales et internationales mais que la Cour accepte 
comme légales deux atteintes de ce droit. Premièrement, si la personne qui fait l’atteinte à la vie 
privée de l’autre est l’épouse du victime, comme dans le cas 86-90297, la Cour reconnaît leur vie 
privée ensemble sans l’intrusion de l’État. Deuxièmement, si l’atteinte est faite par un agent de la 
loi qui a de la cause probable à faire une investigation pour protéger le reste de la communauté, 
cette atteinte est légale s’il suit les directives du code pénal français. Donc, la jurisprudence 
française sur la vie privée souligne comment la Cour a trouvé un équilibre entre les droits 
individuels et les intérêts gouvernementaux. 
                                                
1 Nina Nichols Pugh, “The Structure and Role of Courts of Appeal in Civil Law Systems,” 
Louisiana Law Review 35 (5 1975): p.1168-1169. 
2 France, Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, 11 février 1987, 86-90297. Par. 3. 
3 Id. à Par. 7. 
4 Id. à Par. 8. 
5 Id. à Par. 11. 
6 Id. à Par. 14. 
7 France, Cour de Cassation, Chambre commerciale, 18 janvier 2011, 10-11777, Par. 1. 
8 Id. à Par. 3. 
9 Id. à Par. 4-5.  
10 Id. à Par. 7. 
11 Id. à Par. 6, 8. 
12 Conseil de l’Europe, “Convention européenne des droits de l’homme,” Art. 8, §1, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_FRA.pdf (accessed February 24, 2015) 
13 Id. Troisième moyen, Par. 7. 
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14 France, Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, 22 novembre 2011, 11-84308, Par. 1. 
15 Id. Premier moyen, Par. 1. 
16 Id. Premier moyen, Par. 2-4. 
17 Id. Premier moyen, Par. 6-7. 
18 Id. Troisième moyen. 
19 Id. Deuxième moyen. 
20 Id. Cinquième moyen. Par. 1-2. 
21 Id. Quatrième moyen, Par. 2-3. 
22 France, Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, 15 octobre 2014, 12-82391. Par. 1-4.  
23 Id. à Par. 10, 14. 
24 Id. à Par. 12. 
25 Id. à Par. 12 
26 Conseil de l’Europe, “Convention européenne des droits de l’homme,” Art. 6, §1, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_FRA.pdf 
27 France, Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, 15 octobre 2014, 12-82391. Par. 12. 
28 France, Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, 15 octobre 2014, 12-82391. Par. 12. 
29 Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Ch. 2. 2 août 1984. n˚ 8691/79, §67; cité dans 
France, Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, 15 octobre 2014, 12-82391. Par. 12. 
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Chapter Seven: Analysis and Conclusion 
Introduction  
 Through this study I explore how political cultural affects the degree to which domestic 
legal understandings of privacy are consistent with the international norms. I use aspects of 
Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process in order to understand why privacy norms 
differ by country. To review, Koh explains transnational legal process as, “the theory and 
practice of how public and private actors… interact in a variety of public and private, domestic 
and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of transnational 
law.”1 It is this process of internalization around which I base my study, by using Supreme Court 
decisions in France and the United States to track how international norms correlate with 
domestic legal understandings. Although I am unable to prove a causal relationship between the 
two variables, and thus show if norms are truly internalized, I can make conclusions about the 
level of consistency between domestic and international norms. Furthermore, I am specifically 
interested in how political culture affects this consistency. As noted in Chapter One, I 
hypothesize that political culture acts as a conditional variable on the relationship between 
international norms and domestic law; it can therefore explain why normative understandings of 
privacy law differ in France and the United States.  
 
Analysis 
In order to give the necessary context to my analysis, it is important to briefly discuss the 
inherent differences between the legal systems in question. The American legal system, as noted 
in Chapter Five, is founded on English common law and therefore is greatly based on precedent. 
To make judicial rulings the Court not only looks to the Constitution and to statutory laws 
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created through legislative processes, but also to how similar questions have been previously 
evaluated and interpreted in previous decisions. Future decisions therefore indicate an evolution 
in terms of how a constitutional or statutory principle has been understood and re-evaluated as 
society changes. However, this same concept of judicial precedent is not applicable to the French 
judicial system, because, as noted in Chapter Six, the French primarily draw from the Roman 
judicial system, which emphasizes codification over precedent. As a result, French Supreme 
Court decisions do not draw from preceding cases, but rather from parts of the French Civil or 
Criminal Code, as well as specific international laws. This approach implies more shorter, less 
analytic judicial decisions, where the court weighs the facts of the case against the specific 
details of the statute to determine if an infringement has occurred.  
A primary theme of significance for my research question relates to how the separation of 
powers is used as a tool for protecting the privacy rights of individuals. Although in national 
security issues the separation of powers more often relates to presidential and judicial powers 
broadly, this is manifested more often in my cases as a separation between the police and the 
judicial branch. French case 12-82391, for example, reflects a lack of clear boundary between 
the police and judicial duties, as reflected by the legality of prosecutorial approval for digital 
surveillance, instead of approval from a neutral magistrate. Less judicial oversight exists for 
police action throughout the process because numerous guidelines are put on police action 
through legislative action, as demonstrated by the extent to which appellate review relies on the 
French code.2 U.S. case Katz v. United States, by contrary, highlights the role of the judicial 
branch as a separate but vital actor in the investigative process. The court in Katz put significant 
emphasis on the importance of the warrant as a means of putting necessary limits on police 
action that ensure the protection of an individual’s fundamental constitutional liberties.3 
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 The difference in the degree of separation between the executive and judicial branches 
primarily reflects a difference in political culture. In France, the legislative branch is given 
significant power to preserve the rights of the individual, as it is the French code on which both 
the judicial and executive branches rely. In the United States the judicial branch has a more 
constant check on investigations throughout and after the investigative process. Ultimately, the 
U.S. and France, in Katz and 12-82391 respectively, still recognize the rights of the individual to 
be secure from unwarranted government intrusion; it is the process government action must take 
that differs as a result of political culture, not protection of the right itself. Thus, although it 
manifests itself differently due to political culture, the careful separation of power remains a tool 
for ensuring the protection of individual privacy rights in both countries.  
 The position of the actor infringing another’s privacy rights also influences the 
application of privacy law. It is the person or institution responsible for the infringement of 
privacy that is most notably addressed in these decisions. The degree to which the courts allow 
this actor’s interests to outweigh an individual’s right to privacy often depends on whether they 
are private or government actor. The courts in both countries give greater protection to 
individuals against government intrusion. For example, in the three U.S. cases that involved a 
police investigation (Katz, Jones, and Riley), the Court required strict adherence to a warrant and 
other standard procedures designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights whenever the 
investigation involved either a physical trespass or a violation of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Similar protections exist in the French cases, although, as previously noted, they 
primarily come from the French code. The Courts in both countries are careful to preserve an 
individual’s right to privacy, whether in relation to their movements, their conversations, or their 
personal effects, from overly intrusive government action. 
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 However, these protections are not uniformly applied, as they may diminish when the 
actor responsible for the infringement of privacy is another individual. In other words, the 
protection of privacy may be outweighed by other legal or constitutional considerations. For 
example, in the U.S. case of Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court applied a balancing test between one 
individual’s right to privacy and another’s right to the freedom of the press under the First 
Amendment. Because this case dealt with a balancing of individual rights, rather than a balance 
between a state interest and an individual right, the right to privacy did not receive guaranteed 
preference and could be more easily outweighed. The French case 86-90297, which dealt with a 
husband wiretapping his ex-wife’s phones, similarly provided a different view of privacy right 
than in the cases dealing with governmental intrusion of privacy. Because of the facts of the case, 
the Court looked not only at the privacy rights of the victim of the wiretapping, but also the 
privacy allotted to the relationship between the parties. The Court held that while the individuals 
were married, any wiretapping was not illegal, but following the divorce it became an 
infringement on the wife’s private life, and thus criminal activity. This case also concerns the 
power of the State in relation to privacy issues because the relationship of the married couple is 
granted such a degree of privacy that the State is unable to intervene to protect the privacy of one 
of the individuals. In both countries, the protection of the individual’s privacy is more dynamic 
and dependent on other factors when it is infringed by another private individual, rather than by 
the government. 
The power acknowledged by the Court to violate a right to privacy is also affected by the 
nature of the individual whose right is being infringed. The extent to which an individual’s life is 
subject to public scrutiny is, for example, a considerable factor when the Court determines what 
level of protection the individual’s right to privacy receives, as was the case in the U.S. Supreme 
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Court’s decision in Bartnicki. Because the individual whose private conversations were 
publicized had a public role in a labor union, the Court found that his conversations related to 
that function were considered less private and thus were subject to a lesser degree of protection. 
Similarly, in the French case 10-11777, which concerned government seizure of a laptop and 
other technological effects as a part of a tax fraud investigation, the Court reviewed a case where 
the individuals in question were in a different position than the average individual under 
investigation. In 10-1177, the owners of the laptop and other electronics were also leaders of the 
company under investigation; their expectation of privacy over the seized effects was affected by 
the public nature of the company. However, in reviewing the possibility of a violation of privacy, 
the Court, in this case the Commercial chamber of the Court of Cassation, analyzed the 
individual right to privacy in a similar manner to the other studied cases, which appeared before 
the Criminal chamber. Because the investigation carefully followed the limits of the judicial 
authorization, it was considered a legal breach of privacy.  
The varying degree of privacy rights afforded to individuals, although a standard concept 
between the two countries, manifests itself differently in France and the U.S. and reflects aspects 
of each country’s political culture. In France, the Rousseauian tradition is where the right to 
privacy is more general, and not just a right to privacy from unwarranted government invasion. 
The United States Bill of Rights protects individuals from government intrusion, not from 
individuals’ transgressions. Although the law protects against individuals, such as Title III of the 
law cited in Bartnicki, the priority is to protect against government intrusion.4 Again, each court 
provides a recognition of the right to privacy that should be protected, although this recognition 
is somewhat influenced by political culture. However, the nature of the actor whose privacy is 
infringed and the actor who is violating it also affects the degree of protection granted.  
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The degree to which each country’s court draws from international law is another 
interesting detail linked to political culture. While the French court in these cases never explicitly 
uses international law, either from the United Nations or the European Union, attorneys appeal to 
the logic and validity of international law to support their arguments. In both 10-11777 and 12-
82391, the appeals cite the European Convention on Human Rights, a convention adopted in 
1950 that made the protections of the UDHR binding for countries in the European Union.5 
Contrarily, the United States Supreme Court never cites international law in the three decisions 
cited, nor does the decision mention any of the briefs submitted making an appeal to 
international law. Although the weight given to international law is not specifically linked to the 
historical aspects of political culture discussed in Chapter Four, for France it represents the 
evolution of political culture with the country’s membership in the European Union. For the 
United States, the lack of reference to international law, at least in these four privacy cases, 
demonstrates the overwhelming priority given to sovereign, domestic law. 
A final consideration relates to the manner in which each country adapts their 
conceptions of privacy protections to changing technology. This is one area where political 
culture seems particularly relevant, as the cultural influences on the judiciary affect the manner 
in which privacy norms are reconsidered in relation to new technology. The U.S. Supreme Court 
draws from its English common law heritage by heavily relying on judicial precedent. This 
evolution can be seen in the four U.S. privacy cases, beginning with Katz v. United States, where 
the Court builds off of previous search and seizure cases in order to create a new understanding 
of how privacy applies to individuals under the Fourth Amendment. The Katz test is then cited in 
both Jones and Riley as a principle from which the Court can draw for understanding how 
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foundational understandings of Fourth Amendment protections, and privacy rights by extension, 
can be applied to newer technology such as GPS and cell phones.  
By contrast, the French court is influenced by the codifying traditions of Roman law. As 
mentioned earlier, rather than interpreting previous decisions, the Court of Cassation determines 
whether current French code may apply or if new law is needed. For example, in case 11-84308 
from November 22, 2011, the Court considered the legality of a police investigation involving 
the use of GPS on a car. Although the French code did not specifically address the legality of 
such technology, the Court was able to apply existing legal norms regarding searches to the 
question at bar. The Court determined that because similar information could be obtained 
through visual surveillance and that the application of the GPS technology was authorized by the 
necessary authorities, it was no different from less advanced forms of surveillance already 
considered acceptable. The decisions from both Courts suggest that new legislation is not always 
necessary for a court to evaluate how privacy norms apply to new technology. Whether through 
the application of pre-existing judicial principles and tests or parts of the legal code, both Courts 
are able to adapt current law to emerging technologies. However, this raises the question as to 
whether existing legal foundations are adequate for understanding how privacy rights are 
implicated by more invasive technological means of investigation. 
There are therefore four main patterns evident within the eight court decisions in my 
study. First, the effects of political culture on the separation of powers alters the process through 
which the State reviews privacy rights, although it does not affect the State’s recognition and 
protection of the rights themselves. Second, the ability to outweigh an individual’s right to 
privacy is determined by the nature of the actor responsible for the infringement; the 
government, for example, is often less able to infringe upon privacy rights than another private 
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individual. The public or private nature of the individual whose rights are affected also impacts 
the degree to which courts recognize the right to privacy. Third, the degree to which courts 
specifically cite international laws also signifies an important cultural difference. Fourth, the 
method of reviewing judicial questions, which is highly affected by political culture, is often 
responsible for how privacy protections are applied to new issues of technology. However, the 
difference in how new issues are reviewed, in weighing new technology against privacy 
interests, does not diminish the established recognitions of privacy.  
 
Conclusion 
 The eight court decisions reviewed appear to provide support for the hypothesis that 
political culture affects the relationship between international law and domestic law, but also 
influences the degree to which domestic judicial decisions are consistent with international 
norms. Through the decisions studied, characteristics of international laws, such as protection 
against arbitrary interference with an individual’s privacy, were mirrored in aspects of the 
Court’s reasoning. The notable differences between French and U.S. court decisions derived 
from the manner in which these questions were reviewed. Because the manner of reviewing 
questions is heavily dependent on political culture, it would seem that, in the context of this 
study, political culture acts as a conditional variable. 
 To measure the relationship between international and domestic law, I primarily draw 
from Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process, which he defines as being 
nontraditional, nonstatist, dynamic, and normative.6 I focus on the latter two of these 
characteristics, by viewing international law, or transnational law as Koh would view it, as 
dynamic, in the sense that it is constantly changing and evolving, and normative because it is 
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based on norms. The significance that Koh puts on the normative component of transnational law 
helps explain how there is a notable consistency between the recognized privacy protections on 
an international and domestic level, even when courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, do not 
specifically cite or consider international law in their decisions. Because my study highlights the 
extent to which privacy norms are consistent between domestic and international law, it supports 
aspects of Koh’s theory of transnational legal process. The influential role of political culture can 
thus provide greater context for understanding how transnational legal processes may 
realistically play out in different cultural contexts. 
 My study can also help to address some of the earlier concerns voiced by international 
legal scholars. Scholars such as Daniel Bethlehem, Jagdish Bhagwati, and Rafael Domingo have 
voiced that international law is inadequate to deal with the increase in globalization where 
interactions are no longer as limited by sovereign borders.7 However, by focusing on how 
international law becomes a set of norms that are internalized by individual countries, 
international law can still be relevant to an increasingly globalized world. The consistency 
between privacy law between the UDHR and U.S. case law, even though the U.S. Supreme 
Court, never explicitly cites international law would suggest that the process of internalization is 
not always a conscious, political action. As such, it would pose less of a direct threat to a 
country’s sovereignty; instead of being a challenge to a domestic country’s laws, international 
norms complement domestic judicial analysis and become a part of domestic law. However, it is 
also possible that the consistency between domestic and international law in this case is simply 
the result of the countries studied having a major role in the creation of international law. 
Because they also created these laws, assimilation to new international norms was never 
necessary to the same extent that it may have been for other countries or for other laws. 
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 Transnational legal process, as applied in this study, also provides another layer to an 
understanding the efficacy of different sources of law. Although Larry May discussed the 
manners in which soft sources of international law, such as jus cogens norms, may supersede 
hard sources of international law, such as treaties, the distinction between these sources may be 
less distinct.8 My method of operationalizing my independent variable includes understanding 
“hard sources” of international law, such as the UDHR, as representative of international norms, 
or “soft sources”. By considering hard and softs sources as inherently linked, it is easier to 
understand how soft sources of international law may help countries to implement hard sources 
of international law. In other words, we can better understand how aspects of international laws 
are implemented on a domestic level by looking more specifically at how the relevant 
international norms have been internalized. This unification of hard and soft sources also 
provides support for H.L.A. Hart’s argument that international law, despite being difficult to 
enforce, may gain legitimacy through practice and general acceptance.9 Although Hart proposes 
a more positivist view of international law, where laws are clearly written and defined, the 
practice and acceptance of law demonstrates a normative element that, if applied to more general 
international norms, may assist with a more broader implementation and recognition of 
international legal concepts. 
   
Questions for Future Research 
There are numerous opportunities for the results of the study to be expanded upon or 
simply drawn from in future studies. First, the design of my study is primarily based around 
Koh’s third and fourth characteristics of transnational legal process, as my research focuses on 
laws being dynamic in normative. One way of expanding upon my own research is to better 
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consider and apply the first two characteristics of Koh’s theory of transnational legal process: 
nontraditional and nonstatist. Consideration of these factors would require a research design that 
analyzes the manifestation of international norms in a context other than formal court decisions, 
as the judicial branch still fits into a more traditional, state-centered classification. Other aspects 
of a country’s culture, such as business actions or the media, may provide a more nuanced view 
of the process through which international norms are fully internalized within a country. 
Similarly, an analysis of media portrayals of privacy could indicate a difference between how 
governments internalize norms and how people understand privacy. 
The scope of my study was limited to a narrow class of international law: privacy law as 
it applies to individual liberties. To better understand the relationship between international 
norms, domestic law, and political culture it would be beneficial to conduct apply similar 
methods to other areas of law. I studied international laws that more abstractly recognized human 
rights, therefore leaving a certain degree of variability when applied in domestic law. If my 
research design were applied to more concrete, detail-oriented international law, this would 
allow scholars to better understand the discrepancies between domestic and international law, as 
well as how political culture explains these differences. This would also help us to understand if 
more abstract norms are better internalized than specific international law, and to what extent 
this may be true. Furthermore, applying this model to privacy court decisions in other countries 
with a greater difference in political cultures may provide greater evidence for the role of 
political in the internalization process. My research indicated high consistency between 
international norms and domestic judicial decisions; however, further research could help us 
better understand if this consistency would remain true for other forms of international law or in 
other countries. Similarly, further research could be done on the extent to which courts cite 
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international law in other areas and the other aspects of political culture that may influence this 
level of citation. 
There are also other areas for future research by applying my research design to a greater 
variety of case law. For example, my conception of privacy in the context of newer technology 
was somewhat limited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s application of the Fourth Amendment to 
searches and seizures involving technology. Because the international laws in question, such as 
Article 12 of the UDHR, also refer to protections on an individual’s family, correspondence and 
reputation, there are aspects of privacy rights that are not encompassed by traditional Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. If this study were expanded to include cases that involve conceptions 
of privacy found in other Amendments, such as the First or Fourteenth Amendments, it may be 
possible to better understand how the Court more generally internalizes privacy norms. 
Furthermore, in France there was a case that appeared before the Commercial chamber instead of 
the Criminal chamber, because it involved a tax fraud investigation. Although the Court still 
applied the same privacy considerations as it would in other criminal appeals, it would be 
interesting to focus more specifically on how the type of investigation affects the privacy rights 
that are recognized and to what extent they are affected. This could be especially relevant 
because the debate on international privacy norms arose from a critique of how the U.S. National 
Security Agency invaded individuals’ digital privacy for the sake of national security. By 
focusing on the implications of the type of investigation, we can better understand how privacy 
rights are affected differently in criminal investigations and issues of national security. 
Finally, the courts chosen for my dependent variable may not properly indicate how 
privacy rights are always protected. The question of privacy between the U.S. and other nations 
was recently triggered by the surveillance policies of the National Security Agency. These 
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policies were not reviewed by the Supreme Court, but rather the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (commonly referred to as the FISA Court). Because the FISA Court reviews 
warrants for “foreign powers” and “agents of foreign power” and is not subject to the same level 
of public oversight, it would likely weigh privacy concerns in a different manner from that of the 
Supreme Court, yielding decisions with fewer similarities to international norms.10 A research 
design focused on FISA Court actions may allow for a more comprehensive view at how privacy 
rights are implicated by all surveillance related to technology, not only policies that may be 
considered by the Supreme Court. 
 This research project evolved from a curiosity about how new technology affects 
individuals’ rights to privacy, as well as how varying countries recognize these rights differently. 
I wanted to explore how political culture may influence the manner in which countries 
implement international law and internalize international law. By choosing France and the 
United States, I could analyze the nuanced role of political culture in countries with similar 
political systems and membership to international organizations. Through my study of four cases 
from the U.S. Supreme Court and from the French Court of Cassation, I learned that both 
countries recognize very similar rights to privacy. However, it is the process through which the 
State evaluates privacy and the manner through which the Court applies privacy right protections 
to questions of new technology that are affected by political culture. Although political culture 
does have an influence on the process of internalization, there was a higher level of consistency 
in terms of the rights recognized than I had anticipated. This suggests that political culture has an 
influential role when norms are internalized but that this role is limited. The extent to which it is 
limited, as well as the other specific factors that affect norm internalization are questions for 
further research.
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